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"[O]ne of the clearest lessons which can be read in the 
book of history is that biological and cultural cross-
fertilization have preceded or accompanied epochs of rare 
vitality. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"[G]lobalization, [the] denationalization of markets, laws and politics 
in the sense of interlacing peoples and individuals for the sake of the 
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1. Clyde Kluckhohn, The Way of Life, THE KENYON REV. l l:l, 1941, reprinted 
in 1989: 143, 144. 
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common good"2 (and expanding communications technology), has 
brought the world of transnational law3 to the door of the country 
lawyer.4 As a result, the U.S. American5 practitioner, now more than 
ever before, operates in a world society and economy constituted not 
only of an international society and economy but also of interdependent 
nations' societies and economies.6 The globalization process has given 
rise to the development of transnational law practice. 7 
2. Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: 
The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 405-406 (1995), 
citing Jost Delbruck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for 
Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STIJD. 9, 11 (1993). 
3. See Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational Requirements 
for Law Practice in -a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TuL. L. REV. 
443 (1989). Professor Goebel notes that there are "at least seven different types of 
major transnational legal practice: contractual and transactional; foreign investment and 
local law counseling; international banking and finance; international antitrust; 
international arbitration and litigation; international tax planning; and trade law." Id. at 
444. 
4. Michael P. Waxman, The Comparative Legal Process Throughout the Law 
School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Culture and Competence in a Pluralistic 
Society, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 391, 391 (1991). Professor Waxman has addressed the 
importance of communications technology in the practice of comparative law. This 
article will not expand on the nexus between globalization and communications 
technology as they affect the practice of law. It will discuss, instead, the importance of 
teaching the law of foreign countries in their domestic language, focusing at a minimum, 
on the foreign law of the United States' major trading partners, and specifically, on 
Mexican law, culture, and Spanish legal language. Spanish legal language refers only 
to the legal language used in Mexico. 
5. The term "American" is considered by other inhabitants of the Northern and 
Southern American hemispheres as being inaccurate and exclusionary. Therefore, this 
article uses the term "U.S. American" because it is politically and descriptively accurate. 
6. Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617 (1995). Professor 
Berman calls our attention to the ''interlacing of peoples" that has occurred since World 
War II. 
Id. 
[F]or the first time in the history of the human race, most of the peoples of 
the world have been brought into more or less continual relations with each 
other. We speak without hesitation of a world economy, a world technology, 
world-wide communications, world organizations, world science, world 
literature, world scholarship, world travel, world sports. 
7. See David M. Trubek et al., Symposium, Global Restructuring and the Law: 
Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational 
Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994); see also Richard L. Abel, Transnational 
Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994). For a discussion of strong 
resistance to opening the international marketplace to trade in legal services by allowing 
lawyers to practice outside their home jurisdiction on a regular basis in a foreign 
jurisdiction, see Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Note, Liberalizing International 
· Trade in Legal Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941 (1995). It should be noted 
that despite this resistance, talks continue regarding opening the international 
marketplace to legal services. More importantly, for the purposes of this article, there 
are many ways in which foreign law is being practiced domestically without ever having 
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Transnational law, first recognized as a separate area of law in the 
1950s, is comprised of: 
[T]he law applicable to the complex interrelated world community which may 
be described as beginning with the individual and reaching up to the so called 
'family of nations' or 'society of states' .... [It] include[s] all law which 
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and 
private international law are included, as are other rules [such as local law] 
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories. 8 
Historically, U.S. American law schools (law schools) have not trained 
law students for practice in the area of transnational law. The typical 
law school9 curriculum has required general common law courses and 
has offered electives in the areas of jurisprudence ( e.g., legal realism and 
social policy), specialization ( e.g., bankruptcy law), and some profession-
al skills (e.g., negotiations). More often than not, study in the area of 
transnational law has been limited to survey courses in international and 
comparative law. 10 Although comparative and international law courses 
have endeavored to teach students theory as well as ·practical skills,11 
these disciplines have not prepared students for transnational practice. 
One consequence of not preparing students for practice in transnational 
law is that these disciplines are marginalized12 within the law school 
to leave the home jurisdiction. 
8. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW l-2 (1956); see also Goebel, supra 
note 3. 
9. See Robert Macerate et al., Legal Education and Professional Development-
An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the 
Profession: Narrowing the Gap, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADM. TO Tiffi BAR 
passim (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate, Report] (scrutinizing the well-established model). 
10. See, for example, Alejandro M. Garro, The Teaching of Latin American Legal 
Systems in U.S. Law Schools, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 271,272, 275-76 (1988), for a history 
and survey of teaching courses on Latin America, indicating, generally, the comparative 
nature of Latin American law courses. 
11. See Gunter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law, 
26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 412 (1985) (noting that comparative law courses seek to 
'deprovincialize' and 'cross-fertilize' "the minds of law students and teachers and 
[provide] a 'meeting of the minds' and easier cooperation between lawyers here and 
abroad"); see also Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical 
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811 passim (1990) (reviewing international law studies 
including, inter alia, theoretical approaches to teaching international law [public relations 
of governments] and recent expanded areas of international law [private parties' relations 
with governments based on international treaties]). 
12. See Frankenberg, supra note 11, at 419-20 (emphasizing the limited interest 
that law schools have had in offering comparative law courses which have had to be 
"'squeezed' out of the law school[;]" and, concomitantly, the limited interest of law 
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curriculum. 13 Other areas of transnational law, such as the domestic 
law of other nations (i.e., foreign law),14 have largely been ignored. A 
few law schools have offered some courses in foreign law.15 Only one 
school has offered a course in foreign law in its domestic language.16 
The philosophy underlying the typical law school curriculum has been 
to prepare students for the practice of law by teaching them the basic 
substantive common law through the case law method. It is assumed 
that when students enter the profession, they will apply the learned 
methodology and general concepts of the common law to their chosen 
area of practice.17 It is further assumed that the same methodology and 
analytical approach will suffice for practice in the areas of transnational 
law. The latter assumption is erroneous. Since civil law, not common 
law, is practiced in the great majority of foreign legal systems, the 
professors and students in the area because it has been perceived to be "quite 
unattractive and unrewarding . . . [professionally because it has been unprofitable]") 
(citing H. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 23 (2d.ed. 1949)). See Trimble, supra note 
11, at 811-12 (referring to the lack of interest by law schools and law professors in 
international law) (citing John King Gamble, Jr. & Natalie S. Shields, International 
Legal Scholarship: A Perspective on Teaching and Publishing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39, 
40 ( 1989) ). Like Frankenberg, Trimble claims that the marginalization of international 
law is due in part to deficiencies in scholarship in the area. 
13. The exception has been the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law 
at Columbia University. 
14. At common law, "foreign law" encompasses both the law of sister states and 
the domestic law of foreign countries. In this article, the term "foreign law" refers to 
the latter. 
15. Boalt Hall, for example, has intermittently offered Japanese Contract Law. 
Telephone Conference with University of California School of Law, Boalt Hall 
Registrar's Office (Oct. 23, 1997). Two schools, the University ofHouston, Law Center, 
and Southern Methodist University, have specifically offered courses on Mexico from 
a comparative law perspective. See Garro, supra note 10, at 272. 
16. St. Mary's University of San Antonio, Texas, recently offered a Mexican law 
course in Spanish by a Mexican law professor. Telephone Interview with Professor 
Roberto Rosas, Visiting Professor from the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico, 
Guadalajara (Oct. 20, 1995). Professor Garro's survey of 1986 showed that ''no teacher 
[answering the survey] reported having the primary course objective of providing 
intensive training in one or more Latin American legal systems." See Garro, supra note 
10, at 275. 
For an approach emphasizing the teaching of foreign language in law school, see 
Vivian Curran, Developing and Teaching a Foreign-Language Course for Law Students, 
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598 (1993), indicating that the University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law has offered "French for Lawyers" since 1989, "German for Lawyers" since 1993, 
and will expand the foreign-language curriculum to include other languages. The 
courses are "designed to familiarize students with the [foreign] language in a legal 
context." Id. at 598. See also Frank M. Lacey & Jose Garcia Reyes, Training in 
Foreign Languages for Students of Transnational Law: Advanced Legal and Business 
Spanish at Vanderbilt Law School, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 657 (1981). As of the writing 
of this article, this course was no longer being offered. 
17. See, e.g., Macerate, Report, supra note 9, at 4. 
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typical law school curriculum fails to train studentes properly for the 
transnational marketplace. 18 
For practical and parochial reasons, law schools have not offered 
foreign law courses ( either in English or in their domestic language). 
Unquestioningly, law schools have considered it unnecessary to offer 
foreign law courses because students traditionally entered only the local 
marketplace, and therefore, the logical focus of study was U.S. American 
law. Moreover, law schools have considered it impractical to include 
these courses in the curriculum because they would exacerbate already 
limited law school resources, present linguistic and cultural obstacles, 
and create logistic difficulties.19 In addition, an attitude of "parochial-
ism, and a tradition of 'consecrated ignorance' of foreign laws"20 has 
pervaded the law school curriculum. The foregoing factors have resulted 
in a lack of both scholarly interest and institutional and practitioner 
support.21 Thus, practitioners interested in the transnational market-
place have had to educate themselves about that marketplace without the 
benefit of substantive legal education and training.22 
18. See Goebel, supra note 3 ( criticizing the law school curriculum model because 
it does not properly prepare students for the domestic marketplace). See, e.g., Macerate, 
Report, supra note 9, at 330-334 (providing guidelines for solutions to the problems 
raised by lack of skills training in legal education in the recommendations' section, 
"Enhancing Professional Development During the Law School Years"). 
19. See Frankenberg, supra note 11, 419-20 (citing Pound, The Passing of 
Mainstreetism, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 3 (A. von 
Mehren & J. Hazard eds. 1961), and Hessel E. Yntema, Comparative Legal Research, 
54 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1956)). Professor Frankenberg notes the criticism leveled by 
comparativists against the law school curriculum model concerning academicians' 
prejudice toward their discipline. This same criticism applies equally to the concept of 
offering foreign law courses, and foreign law courses in their domestic language, which 
has resulted in their exclusion from the law school curriculum. 
20. Id. at 420. 
21. See Garro, supra note 10, at 276 (indicating a lack of interest on the part of 
full-time faculty). A poorly attended conference on Latin America and Law School 
Curricula held in 1986 at UCLA supports Professor Garro's survey showing a lack of 
interest in the area. 
22. By comparison, the Faculties of Law of some European universities have 
offered courses in foreign law as a regular part of the curriculum. A "fairly typical" 
curriculum in German Faculties of Law, such as that of the University of Saarland, has 
included since 1975 an elective track of study including, in addition to comparative and 
international law courses, Fundamentals of French Law I and II. See RUDOLF B. 
SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 167-68 (5th ed. 1988), citing W. K. Geck, The 
Reform of Legal Education in the Federal Republic of Germany, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 86, 
111-115 (1977). In addition, some European universities offer foreign law courses in 
their domestic language. For example, since 1969, an entire law school, The Center for 
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The paradigm shift that is occurring in the legal profession due to 
globalization should be the impetus for a concomitant paradigm shift in 
legal education. 23 Because of globalization, practitioners (beyond the 
elite law firms) are beginning to offer more services in individual foreign 
countries' laws in addition to their typical common law practice. Yet, 
the majority of these firms do not have lawyers on staff trained in the 
area of foreign law in which they offer services. For example, a brief 
survey24 of firms that identified themselves as dedicating a portion of 
their practice to areas of Mexican law showed that less than thirty 
percent indicated they had Mexican-law trained attorneys on staff in the 
United States. If the remaining firms are not using Mexican law 
consultants or experts, and they are not acting only as conduits for 
finding Mexican counsel, then they must be practicing Mexican law in 
the United States based on experience gained solely on their U.S. 
American practice. At a minimum, these firms are practicing Mexican 
law based on the assumption that they have the ability to gain such 
expertise. 
Lawyers who do not command both a conscious and an intuitive 
understanding of concepts embodied in the terms they and their 
colleagues use are, at a minimum, ineffectual, if not in competent, in 
the Study of English and American Law, University of Clermont, France, has been 
dedicated to offering a degree in English and American law [the courses being taught 
in English], simultaneously with a degree in French law. See Allen Sultan, Teaching 
American Law to French Law Students-In English, 29 J. LEGAL Eouc. 577 (1978). At 
the University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, a course on English law has been taught 
in English since at least 1989. See PA1RICIA KINDER-GEST, MANDEL, DROIT ANGLAIS 
(Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 2d ed., 1993). 
23. There is no universal acceptance of this position. For a contrary opinion, see 
Chapman & Tauber, supra note 7. 
24. This cursory survey was conducted on WestLaw electronic service file WLD. 
The author notes that only twenty-five law firms were included in the WLD directory. 
However, she believes that the number of firms reporting that they dedicate a portion of 
their practice to Mexican law is extremely low. She personally knows of ten firms 
providing such legal services who are neither included in the WLD directory nor in 
Martindale-Hubell and who do not have Mexican-law trained attorneys on staff. She 
believes that there is a high incidence of lawyers, particularly in the southwestern states, 
who are not trained in Mexican law, yet they provide such services. See also Michael 
W. Gordon, Symposium: The United States and Mexican Competition and Trade Law, 
Part One: Establishing an Agency or Distributorship in Mexico, 4 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 71, 
72 (1996) (noting that an area which has long been overlooked since the ratification of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the increase of "a great deal 
· more common trade" and litigation concerning individuals and entities within the 
NAFT A region. "We need to look more at the problems of the people in the trenches, 
the problems of blockage at the border, bills of lading and similar subjects .... With 
more trade comes more commercial litigation .... We have two very different systems 
in which that litigation may take place."). 
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their lawyering.25 Therefore, lawyers who do not command the law, 
language, and culture in which they are counselling their clients, whether 
for transactional or litigation purposes, are not performing their duties 
competently and ethically,26 are courting malpractice27 on a personal 
level, and, on a broader level, are undermining the legitimacy of the 
profession. 28 
This article is a call to law schools to broaden their academic horizons 
to include elective courses in transnational practice by providing 
25. Although this article does not deal with local issues regarding tlie importance 
of culture and language in the legal arena within the United States, these issues should 
not be overlooked. We live in a culturally and linguistically diverse society and our 
laws at various instances throughout history have either protected "diversity" as legally 
valid or refused to recognize it. See, e.g., Hill, infra note 113 passim. Nonetheless, we 
are a multicultural society and there is a reasonable likelihood that practitioners are 
going to have clients culturally and linguistically different from themselves and, 
consequently, it behooves law schools to train future lawyers to function in this 
multicultural market. See also Burnele V. Powell, Somewhere Farther Down the Line: 
Macerate on Multiculturalism and the Information Age, 69 WASH. L. REV. 637, 648-49 
(1994). 
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 & Rule l. l cmt. 
(1983) ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation."). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-4 (1983) ("Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use 
proper care to safeguard the interests of his client. If a lawyer has accepted employment 
in a matter beyond his competence but in which he expected to become competent, he 
should diligently undertake the work and study necessary to qualify himself."). 
27. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 392-94. Waxman notes that "the rise in 
professional liability insurance claims [is] based on 'failure to understand international 
and foreign substantive law."' Id. at 393 (quoting Telephone Interview with Alice 
Hughey, Risk Management Coordinator, American Bar Association [Aug. 12, 1991]). 
See also Chapman & Tauber, supra note 7, at 943 (noting that "[g]lobalization has made 
domestic regulation [of lawyers] more difficult because it increases the complexity of 
the interactions between lawyers, the legal system, and the authorities responsible for 
regulating the legal profession" [citing Trubek, supra note 7, at 418]). 
28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. See also Waxman, supra note 4, at 393-94. 
Professor Waxman voices a strong opinion as to the potential for undermining the 
profession where the profession relies primarily on the judiciary to raise issues of foreign 
law because the profession is inadequately trained to do so. He states: 
Id. 
Although elective judicial intervention may assure the appropriate result in 
some instances, the nature of our adversarial system requires that attorney 
competence be vigorously enforced. Thus, while lawyer incompetence may 
affect individual cases, an overall lack of familiarity with foreign legal systems 
by virtually the entire bar not only invites malpractice, but also undermines the 
validity of our legal system itself. 
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specialized courses in foreign law, taught in their domestic languages,29 
so that students are trained in the basic legal structures, laws, legal 
terminology, and culture of other nations. The purpose is to train future 
practitioners to be competitive in the expanding legal marketplace30 by 
furnishing courses that will provide a minimum level of competence in 
areas of practice regarding foreign law, culture, and legal language.31 
This article argues that Mexican law, culture, and Spanish legal 
language is of particular interest to U.S. American legal education 
29. See, e.g., Lacey & Reyes, supra note 16, at 657. It is recognized that some, 
maybe many, students will be unable to take such a course because it will require a 
minimum working knowledge of the foreign language being used. However, there has 
been an increased interest in studying foreign languages in college at both the 
undergraduate and graduate levels. See, e.g., Russell Gold, Accent Now is on Spanish -
College Enrollment in Language Soars, SAN ANToNIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 10, 1996, 
at 1B (reporting that the Modem Language Association of America's (MLA) survey for 
1995 showed that over 1.3 million college students are studying a foreign language. The 
MLA survey also showed that 53% of college students studying language, study Spanish, 
and also showed that, for the first time since the 19th century, a single language is being 
studied by over 50% of college students [in the 19th century, Greek and Latin were the 
preferred languages]). See also Deb Riechmann, Courses in Chinese, Arabic Gain on 
European Tongues, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 9, 1996, at 22 (noting that 
while Spanish remains the language most studied on college campuses, Chinese and 
Arabic are the fastest growing). 
Furthermore, Professor Curran, supra note 16, at 601 n.4, indicates that a course 
devoted to emphasizing the linguistic aspect rather than the legal aspect of the foreign 
law is not problematic even to students who have never studied the language before 
where cognates are widely used. She has also noted that, according to student 
evaluations, the French legal language course is well received by the students. Over a 
period of four years, many students have taken the course in order to use the language 
skill in their practice. Id. at 605. 
Also, increased immigration from other countries creates a ready pool of foreign 
language speakers. It should be acknowledged that Hispanics and Hispanic-Americans 
will constitute the largest minority population in the United States. Their interests will 
be linked on a practical level to the interests of individuals remaining in their country 
of origin, principally Mexico. See Greg Johnson, Fast-Food Firms Learn Lessons of El 
Mercado, L.A. TIMES, ORANGE COUNTY EDITION, Oct. 8, 1996, at Al (stating that there 
is a population of approximately 29 million Spanish speakers in the United States and 
their current purchasing power is over $220 billion per year, both of which are growing 
at approximately 30% per year, with the greatest concentration of population and dollars 
spent in the areas of Los Angeles and Orange County, California). 
30. See Goebel, supra note 3 passim. See also Chapman & Tauber, supra note 7. 
31. See In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 144 N.E.2d 24, 28, 165 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1957) 
(holding that counsel retained in a matter concerning foreign law, "are responsible to the 
client for the proper conduct of the matter, and may not claim that they are not required 
to know the law of the foreign State ( citation omitted)"). See also In re Disciplinary 
Action David L. Curl, 803 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding counsel violated profes-
sional responsibility standards, including his duty to the court and to his client, when he 
unintentionally mischaracterized a Mexican judgment. Attorney Curl relied on the 
meaning and legal effect of the judgment based on his client's representation and an 
opinion of Mexican counsel obtained in conversation, where both counsel barely spoke 
each other's language.). See also Waxman, supra note 4, at 393. 
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because knowledge in these areas will provide the greatest access to the 
transnational markets of the Northern and Southern American hemi-
spheres. Mexico's border with the United States (and the United States' 
border with Canada) has resulted in the creation of the largest regional 
trade partnership in the world: the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). NAFTA is comprised of 350 million persons.32 After 
Canada and Japan,33 Mexico is the United States' largest trade partner. 
NAFTA not only has opened the door to formal trade and investment 
but also has recognized shared environmental concerns. All of these 
factors contribute to an increase of informal contacts and transactions 
among citizens of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, leading to an 
increased economic and cultural integration of the region.34 Further-
more, Mexico is acknowledged as being the gateway to Latin Ameri-
ca. 35 Law schools should recognize both the impact of NAFTA on 
32. Zamora, supra note 2, at 401. It is agreed that it is larger than the European 
Community (EC). "The population of the North American market [will] be 30 million 
larger than the EC (360 million vs. 326 million) and [is estimated to] produce more than 
$6 trillion a year in goods and services (compared with the EC's approximately $4.5 
trillion)." CANDACE BANCROFT McKINNiss & ARTHUR NATELLA, JR., BUSINESS IN 
MEXICO 48 (1994). 
33. The teaching of Japanese law is also of great interest because of Japan's trade 
partnership status with the United States and should not be overlooked. See Kenneth L. 
Port, The Case for Teaching Japanese Law at American Law Schools, 43 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 643 (1994). Professor Port advocates that law schools teach a comparative course 
of Japanese law in English, because Japanese law "is extremely culture-based; . . . [it 
is] closely allied with cultural values, values which are [very different from ours and] 
as much as two thousand years old .... [And, although] Japan has confronted problems 
very similar to those of the West, with very similar Western statutes, [it] has come to 
completely distinct results." Id. at 648-49. 
34. Zamora, supra note 2, at 401. See also Gordon, supra note 24 passim. 
35. See Mario L. Baeza, Investment and Trade in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 
and Venezuela, 259, 263 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 
No. A4-4397, Dec. 7-8, 1992), stating: 
Mexico is . . . perceived as a gateway to other countries in Latin America. 
Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, for example, recently announced their 
intention to establish a free trade zone, and Chile is considering joining them. 
A strategic acquisition or joint venture with a major Mexican company may 
soon permit a U.S. firm not only to take advantage of increased sales in 
Mexico, but also to be accorded barrier-free entry into other Latin American 
countries. 
Id. See also John Jennings, National Underwriter Property & Casualty-Risk & Benefits 
Management, Investors Slowly Gaining Confidence in Mexican Market (Sept. 25, 1995); 
Stephanie B. Goldberg, South of the Border, 80 A.B.A. J. 74 (1994); and Bronwen 
Davis, Comment, Mexico's Commercial Banki.ng Industry: Can Mexico's Recently 
Privatized Banks Compete with the United States Banki.ng Industry After Enactment of 
643 
formal and informal transactions among citizens of the NAFTA partners 
and Mexico's prominent role amid its Latin American neighbors, and 
adjust the law school curriculum accordingly. 36 
This article discusses why foreign law should be taught in its cultural 
context and in its domestic language. It also explores the multiple 
relationships among law, language, and culture, and suggests the need 
to teach foreign law courses in their domestic language due to globaliza-
tion. It proposes that: (1) U.S. American law schools should be offering 
courses in the law of other countries; (2) the courses should be in the 
domestic language of those countries in order to provide an understand-
ing and appreciation of the legal system, culture, and language of those 
countries; (3) the countries likely to have the most significant relation-
ship with the United States in the twenty-first century are its foremost 
trading partners, Canada, Mexico, and Japan, and at a minimum, law 
schools should offer a year-long course in one of these countries' legal 
systems, culture, and language; and, (4) Mexico is a logical place to start 
because of NAFTA and Mexico's prominent role in Latin America.37 
This article concludes that: (1) practice in areas of transnational law will 
require the soundest training possible;38 (2) the soundest training 
possible includes teaching foreign law in the domestic language of the 
particular legal system; and (3) understanding law in the context of the 
culture and language of which it is a part is essential in the study of the 
law of another country. 
the North American Free Trade Agreement?, 10 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 107 
(1993) (emphasizing the leadership role that Mexico plays in Latin America, citing 
Deidre McMurdy & John Daly, Clearing the Final Hurdles; Trade Ministers Agonize 
Over Final Touches to a Continental Trade Pact, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 17, 1992, at 26). 
36. In Latin America, Spanish is spoken by approximately half a billion persons 
and represents an enormous future market of goods and services. See Gearing Up For 
Mexico and Beyond, THE FINANCIAL POST, Sept. 1, 1992, at 8. 
3 7. The Canadian legal system, its culture and language, insofar as it differs from 
the U.S. American legal system, including, but not limited to the Quebe!;ois legal 
system, should also be considered as part oflegal education. See Arthur T. von Mehren, 
The Significance of Cultural and Legal Diversity for International Transactions, 1-2 Ius 
PRIVATUM GENTIUM 247 (Ernst von Caemmerer, et al. eds., 1969) passim. 
38. A word should be said concerning the choice of not proposing that foreign law 
be taught in English. Although teaching a foreign law course in English is the manner 
in which such courses have been taught traditionally (and, at a minimum, this is better 
than offering no such course at all), it is well recognized that the best grasp of the legal 
culture and use of applicable law takes place via the language of the legal system being 
studied. This approach provides the soundest basis for competent practice. See Lacey 
& Reyes, supra note 16. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING CULTURE AND LANGUAGE 
IN THE STUDY OF LAW 
Generally, legal education has ignored both the role of culture and 
language and the relationship of culture and language to the study of law 
in the classroom. When included in legal education, culture and 
language have been addressed in limited ways, primarily as part of 
survey courses such as comparative and international law.39 Culture 
and language are difficult to study because they are meta-systems 
comprised of objective and subjective qualities that permeate individual 
experience and cognition. Consequently, the nature and properties of 
culture and language, and their important role within. the context of the 
study of law, are difficult to conceptualize. 40 
This section first explores culture and law beginning with a brief 
historical review of analytical approaches applied in the area. Next, it 
discusses the intersection between culture and law from the perspective 
39. But see Rosemary F. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of 
Possessing Identity, in AFTER IDENTITY, A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 251 (Dan 
Danielson & Karen Engle eds., 1995). 
40. Culture is a conundrum. Is there a single "human or meta-culture" or are there 
many "group cultures" or "subcultures?" If there are many cultures, are they defined by 
nationality, by geography, by status (e.g., age, marital status, profession, class, religion, 
political interests, and power relationships), by history or by any combination of the 
above? How does the creation of culture take place? What is the relationship between 
individuals and cultures? Can individuals from one culture fully understand another 
culture and become proficient in the latter? What is the relationship between law and 
culture? How does culture shape law and how does law shape culture? 
The questions regarding language are not any easier, but on one level they are not as 
subtle as the questions pertinent to culture. On the one hand, language does not present 
such subtle issues because language is objectified through repetitive and consistent use 
of symbols, grammatical structures, meanings, sounds, intonation, and accent. On the 
other hand, language raises more subtle issues when one asks, what is the relationship 
between individuals and language? How do individuals relate to each other through 
language? Why do misunderstandings occur even when individuals speak the same 
language? Can individuals truly understand the meaning of a language which is not the 
language of their culture of origin? How does language affect law, and therefore, the 
lives of those creating laws, implementing them, and those subject to them? Are there 
linguistic differences across cultures that are impenetrable? Does language form 
worldview to the extent that it determines how we interpret our surroundings, including 
legal constructs? 
These questions indicate the complexity involved in analyzing culture and language, 
and their relationship to law. They will form the background of the analyses provided 
in this section. 
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of current interdisciplinary approaches to legal theory. This section then 
addresses the relationship of language and culture to the study of law 
and how language and culture shape and influence each other. A 
subsection describes the role of "soft law',41 as part of the legal culture 
of developing societies, and emphasizes the importance of knowledge of 
"soft law" for practitioners of foreign law. This section then scrutinizes 
linguistic and cultural competency and the law, specifically in the area 
of foreign law. It ends with a brief discussion of the role of comparative 
and international law in legal education. This section underscores the 
important relationship between culture, language, and law because legal 
educators can no longer ignore the need to educate law students in 
specialized areas of foreign law. 
A. Culture and Law 
I. An Historical Note 
Traditionally,culture was defined as the study of ''primitive" people's 
customs, artifacts, and oral traditions.42 Early anthropologists and other 
social scientists characterized culture as consisting of a fixed set of 
categories and simple human interactions.43 Thus, social scientists 
viewed culture as static, unicausal, and determinist.44 These notions 
41. "Soft law," here, refers to developing societies' declared aspirations which are 
written and found in international organizations' pronouncements and those countries' 
operational codes which may or may not be written. See Michael W. Gordon, Of 
Aspirations and Operations: The Governance of Multinational Enterprises by Third 
World Nations, 16 INTER-AM. L. REV. 301 (1984) [hereinafter Gordon, Of Aspirations 
and Operations]. 
42. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: 
SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 27-28 (1983). 
43. JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 344 (Harv. Univ. Press, 
1988) (questioning the assumptions that culture consists of a fixed set of categories and 
simple interactions derived from a positivist approach to the study of culture in referring 
to cultural identity and the problems raised by cultural contact). 
Id. 
Stories of cultural contact and change have been structured by a pervasive 
dichotomy: absorption by the other or resistance to the other .... Yet what 
if identity is conceived not as a boundary to be maintained but as a nexus of 
relations and transactions actively engaging a subject? The story or stories of 
interaction must then be more complex, less linear and teleological. 
44. Joann Kovacich, The Legal and Social Construction of 'Culture', 19 LEGAL 
STUD. F. 287, 290 (1995) (noting that a static view of culture, i.e., one that is unicausal 
and determinist, has been criticized by many scholars recently who emphasize "fluidity 
of cultural identities, ethnic boundaries and the negotiation of ethnicity among other 
variables of identification such as age, gender, martial [sic] status, occupation, and 
nationality in particular contexts"). I would add as variables: language, food, dress, 
common history and place of origin, and values (including religious, philosophical, and 
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were based on a positivist approach to the analysis of culture.45 
Rationalism and scientism formed the basis of positivist theory which 
reached its apogee during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.46 Under the rubrics of "scientism" and "rationalism," 
anthropologists and sociologists sought to classify cultural traits and 
behavior of "primitive peoples."47 The rise of relativism, twice during 
this century, changed the face of the study of culture. In the twenties, 
anthropologist Ruth Benedict, an exponent of ethnographic relativism, 
postulated there was no absolute standard for human behavior, and 
consequently, for social institutions, due to the great and infinite variety 
of social orders.48 Later, structuralism departed from the premise that 
the relationship between cultural elements formed meaning and reasoned 
that this relationship existed as a "deep structure" underlying all human 
understanding.49 Subsequently, anthropologists posited that there were 
no objective accounts of behavioral facts (i.e., facts determined from 
cultural context) and anthropologists merely interpreted these facts 
through their own cultural construct. 50 
In the field of law, rationalism and scientism contemporaneously 
formed the basis of the positivist theory which still has some currency 
today.51 The ideological premise of this school of thought was the 
assumption that universal rules existed· external to individuals and 
societies.52 It sought to establish "pure," "logical," or "analytical" 
approaches to law which would allow for consistency, predictability, and 
political values) within particular contexts. 
45. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 52-58 
(1983). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 28-29. 
48. RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 71 (2d ed. 1960). 
49. See Edmund Leach, Claude Levi-Straus~Anthropologist and Philosopher, 
34 NEW LEFT REV. 12 (1965). 
50. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES passim (1973). 
51. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW passim (1961) and PETER 
GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE 32-62 passim (1987). See also Katherine Sobota, Don't 
Mention the Norm!, 4 INT'L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 45, 45 (1991) (emphasizing 
that modem democratic legal systems, such as that of the United States, are "convinced 
that law is a system constituted [solely] by explicit norms"). 
52. Sobota, supra note 51, at 45 {"The underlying idea of this movement was to 
discover (or rediscover) a reasonable system which could regulate human behaviour by 
means of a univocal, complete and comprehensive legal system .... "). 
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stability in legal decision making.53 Legal realism, rooted in relativism, 
rejected the doctrinal formalism approach of the positivist school. It 
evolved into an empirical approach54 that attempted to establish that 
facts were subject to objective legal analysis.55 The theoretical 
Achilles' heel of these schools of thought, highlighted by social 
scientists, was that concepts of law and fact and the relationship between 
law and fact vary cross-culturally.56 
Both the study of culture and law have suffered from the analytical 
constraints of scientism and rationalism and their theoretical progeny. 57 
The rise of both the theory of cultural relativism, and later, the theory 
of subjectivism58 have given impetus to more varied, open-ended and 
holistic, complex studies of the relationship between culture and law and 
the study of legal discourse. This interdisciplinary approach has 
flourished and is increasingly applied to a variety of legal studies.59 
53. Id. at 46. 
54. According to this approach, law is what "courts do .... [That is,] lawyers 
[from the Anglo-American legal realism tradition] conveniently remove themselves from 
the debate .over the axioms of their discipline by assuming the attributes of a science, 
thus focusing specifically on the predictive implications of a legal science." Michael 
Saltman, Legal Realism in Cross-Cultural Context, 2 INT'L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF 
LAW 113, 113 (1989). 
55. See Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and 
the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 442 (1987), for an excellent 
review of the development of legal thought in the United States. 
56. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative 
Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 
167 (1983). 
57. See Sobota, supra note 52; see also Saltman, supra note 54, at 114-15. 
Professor Saltman contends that anthropology and sociology suffer from a similar 
problem. "The mistake, that many sociologists and anthropologists make in inferring the 
existence of norms, is the assumption of the sufficiency of their method of establishing 
[the norms'] existence by means of the external observation of recurrent patterns of 
behavior." Id. 
58. See Frankenburg, supra note 11, at 414-16 {discussing the school of Critical 
Legal Studies' perspective on the role of subjectivism in relation to comparative law). 
59. See, e.g., Sobota, supra note 51, at 47-48, for a discussion of the concept of 
"regularities" as a basis for analyzing legal norms within the School of Analytical 
Rhetoric. These regularities: 
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[A]re dynamic cybernetic formations like the living network ofa cell or like 
seasons, fashions, rituals or behavior patterns .... [They] do not direct or 
control nature and they give no universal description of nature. They are part 
of all living action; they organize these actions and they are produced by these 
actions. . . . [S]uch changeable, self-organized patterns, . . . are often 
articulated as rules, but really are only 'regularities'. [From this perspective,] 
a legal text [is] a concrete technique used by a particular person in a specific 
legal situation. The situation is regarded as an open system, which is 
constituted by various influences, whether social, economic, cultural or 
biological. The inner form of speech is regarded as a flexible regularity, rather 
than as a permanent structure. 
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2. The Current Intersection Between Culture and Law 
Social scientists, for the most part, have developed three major 
perspectives as to the nature of culture: culture as "shared knowl-
edge,''60 culture as "conceptual structures,"61 and culture as something 
that falls between these two views.62 This article departs from the 
premise that culture is constituted of all three views. This article asserts 
that culture consists of an accumulation of knowledge, including clusters 
of norms, and that culture is a dynamic process that is intersubjectively 
shared.63 
"Shared knowledge" is that knowledge which people must know in 
order to behave in the manner they do, to produce the objects they do, 
and to "interpret their experience in the distinctive way they do."64 
Cultural knowledge is neither inert nor passive. It is an open and 
hermeneutic process comprised of conceptual structures. These 
structures consist of the adaptation of cultural knowledge to daily 
experiences, allowing individuals to understand their experiences 
contextually, while simultaneously promoting cultural stability65 
through normative systems. Written and oral language is an interpretive 
experience and is one of several methods of cultural communication 
which contributes to the flexibility and creativity of culture.66 
Id. For an example in the area of Bankruptcy law, see Kenneth D. Ferguson, Discourse 
and Discharge: Linguistic Analysis and Abuse of the "Exemption by Declaration " 
Process in Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANK. L.J. 55 (1996), where the author performs a legal 
and linguistic analysis of the false claim, false statement, and perjury issues within the 
context of the bad faith claims exemption. 
60. See Naomi Quinn & Dorothy Holland, Culture and Cognition, in CULTURAL 
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 3, 4 (Naomi Quinn & Dorothy Holland eds., 
1989). 
61. Id. at 3-4. See also Roy G. D'Andrade, Types of Culture Theory, in CULTURE 
THEORY 88, 114-16 (David Kaplan & Robert A. Manners eds., 1985). 
62. D'Andrade, Types of Culture Theory, supra note 61, at 115. 
63. Id. at 115-16. 
64. Quinn & Holland, supra note 60, at 4. 
65. Id. (stating that one of culture's properties is the "generative capacity" of 
culture within the myriad of daily simple or complex experiences). 
66. Paul E. Geller, Policy Consideration, Legal Transplants in International 
Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 207 (1994) 
(noting that beginning with ''the linguistic dimension of relativism," one soon becomes 
aware of the cultural dimensions oflanguage in the area of copyright law. Terms such 
as "permanent cultural values" or "property" or ''the most sacred of properties" are 
culturally bound.). 
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Law engenders a complex, hermeneutic process which includes its 
own specialized language and its own shared knowledge, i.e., "legal 
culture." The field of law (or legal culture) has a recognizable internal 
organization based on "protocols and assumptions, characteristic 
behaviors and self-sustaining values" forming an incomplete but 
autonomous social field.67 Law is also fundamentally constitutive. 
"[L ]aw is intimately involved in the constitution of social relations and 
the law itself is constituted through social relations.',68 Law could be 
said to operate inseparably from society, and therefore, from culture.69 
67. Richard Terdiman, Translator's Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of 
Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 805, 806 (Richard 
Terdiman trans., 1987). 
68. Sally E. Merry, Culture, Power, and the Discourse of Law, 209 N.Y. L.R. 209 
(1992). 
69. Id. at 209-211. Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry states: 
Daily talk about the law by ordinary people contributes to defining what the 
law is and what it is not. Ordinary people share understandings of law and the 
way it affects their lives and defines their relationships. These understandings, 
which can be called legal consciousness, include people's expectations of the 
law, their sense of legal entitlement, and their sense of rights. Popular legal 
understanding is not necessarily the same as the professional understanding of 
law . . . . Legal consciousness is fundamental in influencing who goes to court 
with what problems because it shapes which problems are defined as worthy 
of legal intervention and which are not. The legal system sets up expectations 
for providing remedies; people use it, and as they do, they provide the social 
problems on which the law works. 
Id. at 209-10. 
"[Furthermore, ] [l]awyers' practice is ... shaped by ... ideologies .... " Merry, 
supra note 68, at 210, (citing Brinkley Messick, Kissing Hands and Knees: Hegemony 
and Hierarchy in Shari'a Discourse, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 637 (1988)); Austin Sarat 
& William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW 
& Soc'Y REV. 93, 125-28 (1986). 
"[Lawyers' ideologies] come from [legal] training as well as general cultural 
assumptions about conflict and relationships. More generally, as ... lawyers, and courts 
handle problems, popular and professional conceptions of the law structure local 
practices, including the way that problems are labeled and solutions determined." Merry, 
supra note 68, at 211 (citing Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, 
and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 775, 777-79 (1980-1981)). 
"The ability to determine the way that cases are talked about and the relevant 
discourse within which an issue is framed is an important facet of the law's power .... " 
Merry, supra note 68, at 211 citing as examples: JOHN BRIGHAM, PROPERTY AND THE 
POLITICS OF ENTITLEMENT (1990); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLLAM M. O'BARR, RULES 
VERSUS RELATIONSIIlPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Sally E. 
Merry, Everyday Understanding of the Law in Working-Class America, 13 AM. 
ETHNOWGIST 253 (1986); Messick, supra; William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay 
Expectations of the Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 137 (1988); William 
M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small 
Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 661 (1985); Austin Sarat & William 
L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client 
Interaction, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 737 (1988)). 
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Law is local knowledge, a cultural institution compnsmg complex 
processes which vary from place to place and period to period. 70 Law, 
therefore, may be characterized as a component of culture and the 
relationship between law and culture is dynamic and creative. The stud-fi 
of law has shallow meaning when abstracted from its cultural context. 1 
A contextualist approach72 in the study of law suggests that human 
beings always operate within social contexts and make decisions 
contextually.73 This approach74 assumes that the study and practice 
See also JOHN COMAROFF & SIMON ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES 6 (1986). 
Anthropologists Comaroff and Roberts have developed an analytic model that helps to 
understand how conflict talk creates meaning. They describe the process of constructing 
an interpretation in disputing situations as the development of a paradigm of argument, 
which they define as "a coherent picture of relevant events and actions in terms of one 
or more implicit or explicit normative referents." Id. (emphasis in the original). 
70. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative 
Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuR.THER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 
167, 175-219 passim (1983)). 
71. See CLIFFORD, supra note 43, at 344. The complexity of cultural inquiry, in 
the area of copyright law, is aptly illustrated by Geller, supra note 66, at 213-14. He 
suggests applying a new paradigm, consisting of three questions, to ''troublesome cases" 
of interpretation in complex cross-cultural settings where different norms might apply: 
"First, who, in the community of legal practitioners, has power to interpret a rule?" Id. 
at 213. [Is authority centralized in legislators, or is it decentralized in judges having 
discretion to adjudicate on a case-by case basis?]; "[s]econd, what values and theory 
direct the interpretation of rules?" Id. at 214. [Which values are universal in nature, such 
as "equity and reliability" (which may be interpreted differently from culture to culture) 
and which are limited to particular substantive fields; and, how are theories guiding 
interpretation of legal terminology?]; and "[t]hird, what premises are assumed about the 
facts to which rules are to apply in practice?" Id. [Different norms might apply, 
depending on the factual assumptions being made which will be subject to the rules to 
be applied]. The purpose is to understand the underlying normative values of the 
particular society in order to arrive at an interpretation and application of law consistent 
with the society's norms. 
72. A "systemic normativist" approach propounded by HANS KELSEN, PuRE 
THEORY OF LAW 4-6 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1934), is 
consistent with the contextualist approach. The systemic normativist approach is 
premised on the theory that only rules which may be structured consonantly with the 
particular society's norms in which they are going to be applied should be adopted 
because these will engender values of the particular society. 
73. Coombe, supra note 39, at 266-67. 
74. The contextualist approach has been criticized as being relativistic, undermin-
ing moral judgments and the generation of abstract principles of law which guide a 
society. Coombe posits that considering the specific cultural circumstances with which 
individuals are concerned "neither incapacitates us from making moral judgments nor 
undermines the possibility of criticism across contexts." Id. at 266. Moreover, critics 
of the contexualist approach fail to recognize that they themselves (like everybody else) 
contribute to and operate in a cultural milieu. 
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of law is contextually based, forming part of the greater field of shared 
cultural knowledge and the conceptual constructs that form culture. 75 
For example, when ideas are abstracted to general principles of law, 
decision-makers and practitioners (as well as law professors and 
students) employ a choice of relevant cultural contexts that ~ve meaning 
to and determine the effect of general principles of law. 6 "Abstract 
theories . . . are 'rooted in particular contexts and operate within a 
context with real and particular effects that often benefit some people 
more than others. "'77 · 
The cultural context in which the parties in a legal matter, practitio-
ners, and decision-makers, operate must be recognized and analyzed to 
understand the context for legal choices and decision-making.78 
Furthermore, unless practitioners and decision-makers are aware that they 
operate in a cultural context and are aware that their perception is 
culturally predisposed and delimits their comprehension,79 their 
understanding of others' cultural knowledge, including foreign legal 
systems, will be severely limited.80 · 
In the area of foreign law and legal systems, knowledge of one's 
cultural assumptions is crucial81 because choices are drawn from 
cultural contexts with which the individual may or may not be famil-
iar.82 The individual may unwittingly superimpose her cultural 
interpretation on the foreign legal system which will create problems 
because she failed to examine her cultural assumptions. 83 Culture and 
law, as cultural institutions, are objective (social) and subjective 
75. Id. at 266-267. See also Michael W. Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad: Cultural 
Variations Affecting Franchising Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 165 (1994)[hereinafter 
Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad]. 
76. Coombe, supra note 39, at 266-67. 
77. Id. at 267 (citing Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in 




80. See von Mehren, supra note 37, at 249 (noting that "individuals with 
significantly different cultural or traditional backgrounds," find it very difficult "even 
upon mature reflection, to assess the risk of misunderstanding that may inhere in a 
situation" when dealing with legal matters involving transnational issues). 
81. See Frankenberg, supra note 11, at 414-16. 
82. See, e.g., von Mehren, supra note 37, at 249. Professor von Mehren notes that 
often there is greater danger of misunderstanding where apparent similarities exist in the 
legal devices being used, because a practitioner may draw a conclusion that is a 
"comfortable-but potentially dangerous-assumption that other elements (for example, 
legal traditions and practices) are equally comparable." Id. 
83. Id. 
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(interpretive;, experiences which require reflection and awareness by the 
practitioner. 4 
B. "Clash of Cultural Contexts": A Jewish-Iranian Legal Device in 
the Hands of a U.S. American Court 
A California appellate family law case, In re Matter of Noghrey,85 
serves to illustrate the significant legal and cultural ramifications of a 
judicial decision involving parties from another culture and the court's 
cultural assumptions. The case underscores: (1) the contextualist nature 
of legal devices and of abstract theory in judicial decision making; and 
(2) the constitutive theory of law. · 
In Noghrey, husband and wife had entered into a prenuptial agreement, 
a kethuba (defined infra), pursuant to the customs of the Jewish-Iranian 
culture.86 The agreement provided for a "house ... and $500,000.00, 
or one-half of [husband's] assets, whichever is greater" to go to the wife 
in the event of a divorce.87 In exchange for the kethuba, as prescribed 
by Jewish-Iranian cultural norms, the wife affirmed that she was a virgin 
and provided the requisite medical proof.88 
The appellate court acknowledged the cultural basis of the kethuba and 
summarily dismissed the kethuba device, holding it unenforceable on 
public policy grounds because it promoted divorce. 89 In its opinion, the 
84. Id. 
85. 169 Cal. App. 3d 326, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985). 
86. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154. 
87. Id. at 328-29, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55. 
88. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 155. See Rachel B. Wischnitzer, Kethubah, in 6 
THE UNIVERSAL JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 367, 372 (Isaac Landman et al. eds., 1942), 
which provides a sample text of an Eastern European Kethuba which does not need to 
be signed by the bride nor groom, although the groom often executes it. She states: 
Id. 
On the ....... th day of the week, on the ....... th of the month ...... in 
the year . . . .. . . . after the creation of the world, the era according to which 
we are accustomed to reckon in the city of X., N., son of M., spoke to the 
virgin A., daughter of B., as follows: " Be my wife according to the law of 
Moses and Israel, and I will work for you, honor you, and maintain you, 
according to the manner of Jewish men, who work for their wives, honor 
them, nourish them, and provide for them in truth. I will also give you the 
morning-gift of your virginity, 200 denarii in silver coins, which belong to you 
according to the Torah, as well as your food, your clothing, and all your needs, 
and will live with you in conjugal relations." 
89. In re Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 328-30, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154-56. 
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court referred to the long-standing public policy against enforcing 
premarital agreements that provide for a spouse only in the event of a 
divorce.90 The court reasoned that, if it were to hold otherwise, the 
kethuba would discourage husbands from divorcing their spouses but 
would encourage wives to do so.91 According to the court, the husband 
would find it :fiscally imprudent to divorce. The wife, however, not only 
would be encouraged to divorce, she would be likely to do so "lest the 
husband suffer an untimely demise, nullifying the contract, and the 
wife's right to the money and property."92 
Abstracted from the Jewish-Iranian cultural context, the kethuba 
appears to be promoting divorce. The court interpreted the kethuba 
agreement based on the court's own cultural assumption that all women 
are likely to divorce in order to receive an economic windfall. The 
public policy appears "logical" and "equitable," since, without the 
kethuba, both parties would be free to divorce without either the burden 
of an economic penalty or the expectation of an economic windfall. 
However, this result is not logical nor equitable if analyzed from the 
perspective of the culture in which the kethuba device arose, in which 
divorced women lack economic security because of cultural constraints. 
The kethuba is premised on Jewish-Iranian cultural and religious93 
norms and values. The kethuba is a contractual device designed both to 
provide :financial security for the wife and to discourage divorce by 
significantly limiting the husband :financially.94 Several reasons 
justified burdening the husband :financially. In Jewish-Iranian culture, 
the husband has a right to divorce and remarry at will.95 The wife has 
a limited right to divorce and suffers a "loss of reduction of her rights 
should she divorce her husband on certain grounds."96 In addition, 
virginity is highly valued in this culture, and the wife in this case offered 
proof of her virginity before marriage.97 Thus, the wife's loss of 
virginity, because of her marriage, severely limits remarriage.98 With 
very limited opportunities to remarry within the culture, it could 
reasonably be inferred that the wife would become a :financial burden on 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 331, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 156. 
92. Id. 
93. The court specifically refused to address the kethuba 's religious premises, 
claiming that such an analysis would raise anti-establishment clause issues. Id. at 329, 
215 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.2. The kethuba's religious connotations need not be discussed 
here. For this analysis, secular cultural norms underlying the kethuba suffice. 
94. In re Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.2. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154. 
98. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55. 
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her family if she did not have a kethuba agreement (providing for her 
economic security in the event of divorce) with the husband prior to 
marriage. The kethuba equalizes the "playing field" by providing for the 
wife's economic security by intentionally burdening the husband 
financially in the event of divorce. Therefore, the kethuba is a cultural 
device promotive of marriage, rather than promotive. of divorce, as 
reasoned by the appellate court. 
In this case, the court's failure to recognize both that the kethuba 
promoted marriage rather than divorce and the cultural impact on the 
wife caused by its refusal to enforce the kethuba, in fact, shifted the 
balance in favor of the husband under U.S. American norms. Addition-
ally, the court's gratuitous comments regarding the reasons as to why 
husband and wife are likely to stay married in the Jewish-Iranian culture 
pursuant to the kethuba are based on U.S. American stereotypes99 of 
men being "commonsensical" and ''fiscally prudent" and wom~n being 
"golddiggers." Culturally, in this case, the wife's hardship was 
exacerbated because, if she expected to remarry, she probably would 
have to do so outside of her culture because of her loss of virginity. 
In the interests of fairness, the court could have considered the cultural 
context of the kethuba and remanded the matter to determine whether or 
not the wife was sufficiently acculturated to U.S. American society to 
ensure that her loss of virginity would not create an undue hardship. If 
the wife was sufficiently acculturated to U.S. American society, then the 
lack of enforcement of the kethuba would not create a significant 
hardship; if she were not, then the enforcement of the kethuba might 
well be required to prevent undue hardship because it would be 
unacceptable for her to marry outside of the Jewish-Iranian culture. In 
the latter instance, the court would have had the power to hold that the 
kethuba did not violate public policy because it was not promotive of 
divorce, and, instead, enforce the kethuba in the interests of the stated 
public policy and fairness. 
Alternatively, in Noghrey, the court could have reasoned more soundly 
by recognizing both the constitutive nature of the law and the 
contextualist basis of judicial decision-making, and acknowledging that, 
because of the multicultural nature of U.S. American society, the 
"standardization" of legal norms is a highly valued principle in U.S. 
, 99. Id. 
655 
American legal culture. Thus, the court could have concluded that the 
need to maintain a standardized public policy regarding non-enforcement 
of premarital agreements (that settle property on one of the two spouses 
only in the event of a divorce) outweighed upholding the kethuba. The 
court could have strengthened its decision by noting that the kethuba 
could be used to promote divorce in U.S. American culture, in which 
other Jewish-Iranian cultural constraints, such as the limitation on a 
divorced woman's remarrying, might not be operating. 
This case is an example of the failure by a court to analyze the 
meaning of a legal device within its cultural context. The court, instead, 
substituted its own cultural predispositions without question. The court 
in Noghrey, by recognizing the limitations of its own worldview, might 
have considered different and better reasoned bases for its decision. The 
court could have considered the normative value of standardization in 
this society's multicultural context, or, alternatively, remanded the matter 
to determine whether or not the kethuba, in this instance, was or was not 
promotive of divorce. If the kethuba was not promotive of divorce, the 
court could have considered whether fairness required that the court be 
more protective of the wife's rights. The court would also have avoided 
perpetuation of U.S. American cultural stereotypes that stigmatize based 
on gender in its decision making. 
1. Legal Culture and "Soft Law" 
"Soft law"100 is an important aspect of legal culture101 in develop-
100. See Gunther F. Handl, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. Soc'y OF INT'L LAW 
PROC. 371-73 (1988) (opening remarks discussing that while "soft law'' is at the vortex 
of intense debate among internationalists, there is no consensus as to its meaning). "Soft 
law," according to noted internationalist, Michael W. Gordon, encompasses the 
aspirational declarations of international organizations (written but not law) adopted by 
developing nations, and unwritten law (i.e., unwritten law or written, but unpublished 
laws) of international organizations and of developing societies. See Gordon, Of 
Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 302-13, 332-33. Professor Gordon defines 
"aspirational declarations" as written statements that reflect the aspirations of developing 
nations. Id. at 323. They emphasize goals or views of developing nations through 
international organizations, such as the United Nations, and should not be overlooked. 
These views represent an important element in the framework of governance 
. . . by host nations. Emanating from a multi-nation organization, they 
nevertheless illustrate an aggregate response by developing . . . nations. While 
the policies of host nations often are not expressed in writing . . . they are 
written and disclosed in the pronouncements of the multi-nation organizations. 
Id. at 320. See also Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 166-68. 
101. Because of its aspirational and unwritten nature, "soft law" has been criticized 
as not being law at all. See Michael Reisman's remarks in Handl, supra note 100, at 
373-377, for a brief discussion of how soft law fails to meet lawmaking criteria. The 
debate as to whether "soft law" is law or not law is inapposite to this discussion. 
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ing nations, 102 pertinent to the training of future practitioners of 
transnational law.103 "Soft law" serves four functions in legal culture. 
First, declared aspirations and unwritten law are often precursors to hard 
law, i.e., written law.104 Second, unwritten laws constitute the "~pera-
tional code" or the "way things really work" in the legal culture, 10 and 
often determine legal matters.106 For example, unwritten laws often 
are "interpretations of laws," and therefore, attorneys must know about 
unwritten laws in order to understand the meaning of a law in a foreign 
country. 107 Third, "soft law" serves as an instrument of flexibility in 
an era of change allowing for compromise and negotiation.108 And, 
fourth, "soft law" promotes stability during times of rapid change 
102. See Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 320-25. 
103. See Handl, supra note 100, at 372. Professor Handl notes the important role 
of "soft law'': 
[ An abundance of examples exist concerning] formal international law such as 
treaties, whose ineffectiveness relegates them to the ranks of nonlegal norms, 
or, if you will, soft norms, notwithstanding their formal status. And vice 
versa, there is an abundance of, formally speaking, nonnormative documents 
such as resolutions and declarations of international organizations or 
conferences, which have proved to be highly effective internationally and must 
be deemed part and parcel of international normative order. 
Id. (Emphasis added). See also Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, 
and Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75 passim, which examine some problems 
that practitioners encounter in the international area due to lack of cultural knowledge 
or misunderstanding. 
104. Aspirational declarations of nations usually precede enactment of domestic law 
and aspirational declarations of international organizations often transmute into 
customary law. See Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 166-67. 
105. See Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 302-13, 332-33; 
see also, Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 166. 
106. Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 167-69. Professor Gordon 
provides various examples of such "laws" from around the world. For example, in 
Mexico, a U.S. American fast food company was denied a waiver of mandatory joint 
venture provisions based on, inter alia, a reluctance to permit the particular style of 
American cooking involved. In Brazil, government officials determine on an ad hoc 
basis whether or not to apply "drawer regulations" to foreign investment applications. 
"Drawer regulations," as they are known by Brazilian attorneys, remain unknown to the 
lawyer until the official decides to pull them out of the drawer, literally. And in China, 
certain regulations, although written, are not for dissemination to foreigners, and 
therefore, foreign attorneys lack any knowledge as to their existence until they are 
applied to a matter they are handling. 
107. Id. at 183. . 
108. Handl, supra note 100, at 375-76 (discussing the importance of soft law in 
resolving deadlocks among states due to economic and political differences). 
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through "soft" legal decision making bodies, such as mediation and 
alternative dispute resolution panels.109 
In essence, "soft law" is an important part of legal culture because it 
includes both the aspirations and the operational code of foreign legal 
systems of developing countries. Knowledge of the "soft law" of a 
particular nation provides information as to interpretation of written law, 
unstated conventions in the legal community, and trends in legislation. 
"Soft law" also provides information regarding cultural differences 
among legal cultures and leads to greater understanding of cultural 
values.11° Additionally, "soft law" increases during times of rapid 
social change. The process of globalization is a process of rapid social 
change affecting and being affected by increased international economic 
relations, advanced communications technology, and increased environ-
mental interdependence. 111 Consequently, lawyers practicing transna-
tional law involving a particular foreign nation must have knowledge of 
the "soft law" of that particular nation in order to increase their 
professional competency. 
C. Language and Culture 
Language and culture are difficult to discuss separately. Language 
symbols, grammatical structures, meanings, sounds, intonation, and 
accent are culturally defined.112 Culture and enculturation form ideas, 
methods of analyses, perceptions, behaviors and beliefs. The language 
selected to structure and convey these cultural phenomena reflects 
109. See Christine Chinkin's remarks in Hand!, supra note 100, at 39L 
110. See Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 183-84, which underscores 
the relationship between "soft law" and culture, and how important it is for lawyers to 
understand the role of culture: 
Id. 
Culture is elusive. It is difficult for a person from one nation to fully 
understand what a person from another nation views as culture and what 
emphasis and value that nation places on culture, and therefore, its protection. 
. . . [W]e are remiss in acting as international counsel if we fail to understand 
the importance of culture in functioning abroad, and to advise our clients to 
consider cultural aspects of doing business abroad. That will include a broad 
range of activities .... The variations of culture make the lawyers' role more 
demanding and complex. 
111. See Hand!, supra note 100, at 372; see also Pierre Marie Dupuy's remarks in 
Hand!, supra note 100, at 382. 
112. For example, compare Chinese characters with American English characters; 
compare the letter "c" in English and the letter "ch" in Spanish which does not exist in 
English, although the sound is denoted through the combination of the letters "c" and 
"h." 
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cultural content.113 Language is a product of culture and, simulta-
neously, is formative of culture.114 Scholars have long recognized that 
language, like law, does not exist in the abstract. 115 Language is 
understood because of culture. 116 
In 1939, Professor Leslie Spier published a seminal cross-cultural 
study, comparing the relationship of "habitual thought" and "habitual 
behavior" of speakers of the Hopi Indian language and speakers of the 
"Standard Average European" (SAE) languages. He found that: 
"[H]abitual thought" and "thought world" [mean] more than simply language, 
i.e., than the linguistic patterns themselves. [They include] all the analogical and 
suggestive values of the patterns (e.g., our "imaginary space" and its distant 
implications), and all the give-and-take between language and culture as a 
whole, wherein is a vast amount that is not linguistic but yet shows the shaping 
influence of language . . . . [T]his "thought world" is the microcosm that each 
man carries about within himself, by which. he measures and understands what 
he can of the macrocosm. 117 
In other words, the individual processes the situation around her based 
on cultural information which is obtained heuristically. Thought that 
precedes language is shaped by the concepts and values embodied in the 
language of the individual, forming the individual's cultural perception. 
Language and thought process are inextricable, us and both are 
inextricable from culture. The processual relationship between language 
and thought may be characterized as "linguistic thought" and "linguistic 
behavior.""9 Linguistic thought is the "hermeneutic response a person 
has to the spoken or written language."120 Professor Edward Sapir 
113. Donald K. Hill, Linguistic Thought and Behavior: Sociolinguistic Consider-
ations in Multicultural Legal Education, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 571, 576 (1991) 
emphasizes the intertwined role of culture and language. 
114. This does not mean that language is not subject to separate analysis. 
Linguistics is a well established area of study. 
115. Quinn & Holland, supra note 60, at 5 (noting that artificial intelligence 
researchers who attempted translation by computers "discovered that language cannot be 
understood, much less translated, without reference to a great deal of knowledge about 
the world"). In other words, one of the reasons that translation by computers has failed 
is that the use of language is culturally based; it is complicated and subtle. 
116. See Hill, supra note 113, at 576. 
117. Id. at 573 (citing JOHN B. CARROLL, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY: 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 147 {John B. Carroll ed., 1967)). 
118. Quinn & Holland, supra note 60, at 9; see also Bourdieu, supra note 67, at 
809. 
119. Hill, supra note 113, at 572-81. 
120. Hill, supra note 113, at 572. 
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explained, "[w]e see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as 
we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain 
choices of interpretation."121 For example, in some instances individu-
als will not conceptualize an idea, nor identify an event or phenomenon 
because the language a speaker knows does not have an equivalent term 
for the idea, event, or phenomenon existing in another language. 122 
Like culture, linguistic thought is comprised of objective (social) and 
subjective (interpretive) levels.123 Objective linguistic thought deals 
with pragmatic reality, whereas subjective thought deals with emotional 
reality. 124 Objective linguistic thought has been characterized as 
linguistic thought which permits individuals using the same language125 
to participate in the general sociolinguistic or dominant cultural 
environment. Subjective linguistic thought is linguistic thought based on 
the individual's social and historical experience. 
1. Inter-cultural and Inter-linguistic Communication: 
Its Impact on Legal Discourse 
The objective-subjective model of linguistic thought is also relevant 
inter-culturally, 126 and inter-linguistically.127 When individuals from 
disparate cultures and languages interact, such as between English and 
Spanish speakers, variances in understanding occur. Therefore, the 
importance of linguistic thought is underscored. When objective 
121. CARROLL, supra note 117, at 134. 
122. Gary P. Ferraro, "The Need for Linguistic Proficiency in Global Business," 
BUSINESS HORIZONS 39, 40 (May-June 1996) (citing INSUP TAYLOR, PSYCHOLINGUIS-
TICS: LEARNING AND USING LANGUAGE (1990), which illustrates this cognitive 
phenomenon: "[T]he English language lacks a word for the aroma of roasted ground 
sesame seeds, English speakers fail even to perceive the scent until it is pointed out to 
them. Yet Koreans, who have a word for that particular aroma, have no difficulty 
recognizing it when it fills the air."). 
123. See Hill, supra note 113. 
124. Id. at 580. 
125. Professor Hill analyzes linguistic thought and linguistic behavior within the 
phenomenon of perceptual duality [double consciousness] in the context of the Black 
American experience. He maintains that issues arise regarding linguistic thought and 
linguistic behavior even when parties share a common culture and common language. 
He provides significant examples of linguistic thought and behavior involving perceptual 
duality in regards to Black Americans and the judicial system and Black American 
students in relation to cultural-legal terminology and pedagogy in law schools. He 
underscores the issues perceptual duality raises for legal education in the United States, 
i.e., the dissonance that exists due to the insecurity caused by the lack of correspondence 
between subjective and objective thought. Id. at 581-91. 
126. See Geller, supra note 66, at 207 (underscoring that language translation 
problems require understanding "ever-larger contexts, ultimately entire cultures and 
historical periods" in order to provide consistent interpretation). 
127. See Hill, supra note 113, at 581-82. 
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linguistic thought and subjective linguistic thought do not corre-
spond, 128 communication, especially technical communication such as 
legal discourse which embodies value-laden meaning, 129 often will 
result in dissonance, confusion, ambiguity, and misconstruction. 
The primary reason that dissonance, confusion, and ambiguity, and 
thus, misunderstanding and miscommunication, occur is that language 
primarily takes place on a subconscious level. 
When a user/receiver linguistically uses a word or term, the signifier is suppose 
[sic] to produce a mental image in his/her mind which corresponds with that 
intended by its user. For the signifier to be meaningful, the word-image created 
must carry the same or closely approximate signification for both parties. 
When this does not occur, there is an obvious failure to communicate. If the 
signifier produces an ambiguous or contradictory meaning-effect, the result is 
either miscommunications, confusion, doubt, or insecurity. 130 
The speaker or writer generally lacks awareness of"the values associated 
with the selection of signifiers, or of the values associated with the 
meaning-effect of the word or sound-images that are received."131 
Therefore, rarely does a speaker or writer "consciously weigh the value 
of each signifier with respect to the influence which myth or culture has 
had upon the chosen signifier in terms of cultural signification, value, or 
meaning effect."132 The matter is resolved when "the hearer ... 
interpret[s] ... linguistic references from the cultural perspective of the 
128. See von Mehren, supra note 37, at 248-50. 
129. See Geller, supra note 66, at 210. 
130. See Hill, supra note 113, at 582, 582 n.35, citing well-known linguistic 
authority, F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 9, 13 (1966), to explain 
the linguistic concepts of signifier and signification: 
Id. 
Our definition of the linguistic sign• poses an important question of terminolo-
gy. I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image, a sign, but in 
current usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a word .... 
I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace 
concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifie] and signifier 
[significant]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition 
that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are 
parts. 
131. See Hill, supra note 113, at 583. See also the discussion iefra concerning the 
hypothetical as to the form of the legal relationship between the U.S. American and 
Mexican companies which is to be considered in the distribution of a U.S. American 
product into Mexico. 
132. Id. 
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speaker rather than that of the hearer .... " 133 "To do otherwise ... 
create[s] confusion and misunderstanding."134 
D. A Simple Problem of Language and Culture with Significant 
Legal Ramifications: The Single Word 
The following example demonstrates the difficulty of communicating 
the same legal concept inter-linguistically and inter-culturally via the use 
of a single word. The issue arises from variation in the definition of the 
term "investment" in Spanish and in English.135 In Spanish, the term 
investment translates to "inversion." The terms "investment" and 
"inversion" have different Latin roots. In English, "investment," from 
investire, means "to install, to surround, to clothe in a garment;" whereas 
"inversion" in Spanish, from invertire, means "to change position, to 
turn over or turn around."136 This variance in meaning suggests that 
the terms differ diametrically: in the United States "investment" seeks 
long-term benefits, while in Mexico "inversion" seeks short-term 
profit.137 Stated another way, objective and subjective linguistic 
133. Id. at 583 n.37. Professor Hill, again citing to De Saussure, states: 
Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term 
results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others .... [A]ll values 
are apparently governed by the same paradoxical principle. They are always 
composed: 
(l) of a dissimilar thing that can be exchanged for the thing of which the 
value is to be determined; and 
(2) of similar things that can be compared with the thing of which the 
value is to be determined. 
Both factors are necessary for the existence of a value. To determine what a 
five-franc piece is worth one must therefore know: (l) that it can be exchanged 
for a fixed quantity of a different thing, e.g., bread; and (2) that it can be 
compared with a similar value of the same system, e.g., a one-franc piece, or 
with coins of another system (a dollar, etc.). In the same way a word can be 
exchanged for something dissimilar, an idea; besides, it can be compared with 
something of the same nature, another word. Its value is therefore not fixed 
so long as one simply states that it can be exchanged; for a given concept, i.e., 
that it has thus or that signification: one must also compare it with similar 
values, with other words that stand in opposition to it. Its content is really 
fixed only by the concurrence of everything that exists outside it. Being part 
of a system, it is endowed not only with a signification but also and especially 
with a value, and this is something quite different. 
Id. at 583 (citing De Saussure, supra note 130, at 114-15). 
134. Hill, supra note 113, at 576 (stating that this is true even if one of the two 
parties speak the same language or languages). 
135. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Access and Protection for Foreign Investment in 
Mexico under Mexico's New Foreign Investment Law and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 10 ICSID REV. FOR. INVEST. L.J. 54, 76 (1995). 
136. Id. at 75-76. 
137. Professor Ewell provides a series of hypotheticals to illustrate whether a 
business venture, depending on the facts, might be an investment subject to NAFT A and 
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thought will not correspond to the meaning of the term "investment" in 
English -and Spanish. The thoughts being formed in the minds of 
speakers from the United States and Mexico are based on different 
cultural and linguistic backgrounds and divergent values resulting in 
erroneous assumptions, 138 unless the latter are made clear at the outset 
of the legal discourse. Lack of familiarity with the basic difference in 
the meaning of the word, and therefore its intended use, in the contexts 
of the United States Common law and Mexican Civil Law systems, 
respectively, could lead to linguistic and cultural misunderstanding, 
thwart foreign investment in either or both countries, and lead to 
litigation due to miscommunication.139 
E. Two Languages, Two Subcultures and a Single Word Lead to 
Litigation: "What is 'chicken'"? 
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 140 a 
well known first-year contracts case, demonstrates the problems caused 
by misunderstanding and miscommunication because the parties did not 
know each other's commercial subculture (custom), despite speaking 
each other's languages. Frigaliment involves legal discourse concerning 
the definition of an industry term, "chicken" in English, and whether or 
not the U.S. American company (B.N.S.), a supplier of chicken, had a 
breached a warranty under its contract with a Swiss company 
(Frigaliment), a buyer of chickens, by delivering stewing chicken instead 
of broilers or fryers. 141 B.N.S. agreed to deliver to Frigaliment fresh 
frozen "chicken" for consumption in Europe. Both parties' representa-
tives spoke English and German.142 During the negotiations, B.N.S. 's 
and Frigaliment's representatives had exchanged telegrams concerning 
the type of chicken to be shipped.143 Although the telegrams were 
essentially in German, the English word "chicken" was used. B.N.S., 
attempting to clarify the term, specifically asked in one cable whether 
subject to Mexican or U.S. law interpretation. Id. 
138. See e.g., von Mehren, supra note 37, at 255-56. 
139. For another analysis in support of this proposition, see the discussion infra of 
Frigaliment. 
140. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 118. 
143. Id. 
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"chicken" in English meant the German word, "huhn," which included 
both "brathuhn" (broilers) and "suppenhuhn" (stewing chicken) and was 
told, "any kind of chickens."144 The dispute as to the English meaning 
of "chicken" arose because Frigaliment's representatives understood the 
English word "chicken" to mean "young" chicken, i.e., broilers and 
fryers. Frigaliment's representatives understood the German word 
"huhn" to mean both broilers and stewing chicken. B.N.S. 's representa-
tives, however, understood the English word "chicken" to mean "huhn." 
Consequently, B.N.S. delivered, inter alia, stewing chicken to 
Frigaliment in Switzerland. Upon receiving the stewing chicken, 
Frigaliment protested and sued B.N.S. because it had not received broiler 
chicken. 
The federal district court did a painstaking analysis of trade usage in 
construing the ambiguous English word "chicken." The court compared 
the meaning of the term in both English and German, as understood in 
the domestic and international industries. "Chicken," in English in the 
United States, was broadly defined and included broilers, fryers, and 
stewing chicken; whereas, the English term in Switzerland was narrowly 
defined and meant only young chickens, i.e., broilers or fryers. The court 
noted that Frigaliment's subjective intent was to buy young chicken, 
while B.N.S. 's subjective intent was to sell stewing chicken. Thus, 
although the parties' objective linguistic thoughts corresponded, neither 
party 's subjective linguistic thoughts corresponded. The court looked 
to various trade sources from both countries to determine an objective 
definition of the term and then relied on an "objective" source, the 
dictionary, to ascertain that B.N.S. 's subjective intent coincided, at least 
minimally, with the dictionary meaning. The court understood B.N.S.'s 
subjective linguistic thought to correspond more closely to the objective 
linguistic thought of the court as supported by an objective source (the 
dictionary), and thus, held in B.N.S. 's favor. 145 
Frigaliment demonstrates that even though the parties to the transac-
tion speak the same language, or languages (English and German), the 
meaning of words, here "chicken," will be understood differently 
depending on the individual speaker's commercial subculture. Because 
of their lack of mutual cultural knowledge, the parties in the Frigaliment 
case misunderstood and miscommunicated their intent which was based 
on their respective cultural interpretations, affecting their rights and 
obligations under the contract. 
144. Id. 
145. The court held that in this instance the proper construction was the broadest 
definition of the term because of the price terms negotiated. Id. at 121. 
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F. A Complex Problem of Language and Culture with Significant 
Legal Ramifications: An Example of Selecting the Appropriate 
Contractual Device 
The Frigaliment case, discussed above, presents a relatively simple 
linguistic error based on a cultural misunderstanding between parties 
speaking the same languages who had different cultural expectations and 
which had serious legal consequences. This subsection explores a more 
complex potential problem of misunderstanding and miscommunication 
due to linguistic and cultural differences arising when practitioners and 
parties of common and civil law systems interact. The problem was 
recently demonstrated at the Fourth Annual Conference of the United 
States-Mexico Law Institute where panelists from Mexico and the United 
States were asked to address a hypothetical problem concerning a U.S. 
American manufacturer who was distributing a product into Mexico via 
an existing Mexican company.146 It was assumed that an U.S. Ameri-
can attorney would be involved in some manner (if not entirely) in the 
representation of the U.S. American company during negotiations. One 
of the issues the panelists addressed was the form of the parties' legal 
relationship and the type of written contract to be used by the parties 
under Mexican civil law.147 Two panelists, one from each side of the 
border, noted the importance of the U.S. American attorney's under-
standing of the legal concept of "classifying" the legal relationship from 
a civil law perspective, 148 and therefore, the type of contract to be 
used. 
In the jurisprudence of the civil law system, it is assumed that 
behavior and transactions are subject to categorization.149 Consequent-
ly, "classifications have substantive value; they are capable of creating, 
extinguishing, or modifying rights and duties."15° Classifications in 
146. See Gordon, supra note 24 passim. 
147. Gordon, supra note 24, at 72-75. 
148. Id. at 72, 74. 
149. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., Roman Law in Europe and 
the Jus Commune: A Historical Overview with Emphasis on the New Legal Science of 
the Sixteenth Century, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. I, 20-24 (1994); see also 
SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 22, at 299-304. 
150. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 77. 
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Mexico have performative functions. 151 For example, defining a 
contract in a particular manner carries a presumption that it is in fact 
such a contract, although it may be established otherwise. By contrast, 
in the United States, categorizations do not have performative functions. 
They only have theoretical value ''useful only to the extent that they 
reflect transactional reality or help to explain statutory or judicial lan-
guage."152 Therefore, the designation of and the definitions constitut-
ing legal classifications recognized in Mexican law are substantively 
different from classifications in the United States, serving to demonstrate 
to U.S. American practitioners the "foreignness"153 of legal reasoning 
under Mexican law which is based on legal and cultural assump-
tions.154 In the hypothetical situation provided, at least two different 
types of Mexican contracts were to be considered in selecting the 
appropriate classification of the legal relationship between the companies 
concerning the distribution of U.S. American goods into Mexico. The 
two different types of contracts were based on existing legal classifica-
tions, contrato de mediaci6n (intermediary's contract) and contrato de 
comisi6n (commission contract), each with its own tax and labor law 
considerations. The specific classification of the contract would have to 
151. See Bourdieu, supra note 67, at 809 (regarding the performative function of 
law; see discussion infra concerning performative functions). 
152. Bourdieu, supra note 67, at 809. In the United States, for example, designating 
a contract to be an "agency contract" does not create an agent-principal relationship 
which is then scrutinized as to whether or not it complies with the requirements of an 
agency contract. The designation of the contract as an agency contract may provide 
evidence as to the parties' intent to enter into an agency contract, but the result may be 
a valid contract of another nature. 
153. The author is presuming that a U.S. American attorney would be representing 
the U.S. American company in the transaction to some significant degree, either solely 
and directly, or in conjunction with Mexican counsel, such that the U.S. American 
attorney would be deemed to be practicing law under the circumstances. Consequently, 
the notion of the "foreignness" of the Mexican Civil legal system would be important. 
154. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 73, 74, 80. One of Mexican panelists described 
the concept of classification as follows: 
We have behind us Justinian, the Roman law and the Napoleonic Code. That 
means that, generally speaking, when we talk about a particular contract, it is 
as if we are talking about a box or a particular door. If you say "contrato de 
comisi6n" [commission contract] or if you say "contrato de compraventa" 
[sell-purchase agreement] that means that under the civil code you go to a 
building, you go up four stories to the floor called "contracts", you go down 
the corridor and open the door which is called "[sell-purchase]" and there are 
the rules. It is simply a different way of thinking. It's not only important that 
we lawyers in the practice think that way, but the courts think that way too. 
This means, for example, courts are going to apply the rules that they consider 
applicable to the nature of that contract, regardless of the name of the contract. 
Id. at 73 ( emphasis added). 
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be carefully scrutinized during negotiations, before agreeing to a certain 
type of contract. 
Additionally, legal language cognates would have to be used with 
caution during negotiations because the different approach to legal 
classification in the U.S. American common law and the Mexican civil 
legal systems would not result in "word for word" translation. For 
example, the contrato de comision (commission agreement) has two 
different legal meanings and effects. The contrato de comision is either 
an agreement concerning a commissioned act, or an agreement concern-
ing the payment of a commission.155 The former contract is almost 
analogous to an agency agreement at common law. Through this device, 
the U.S. American principal would be deemed to be doing business in 
Mexico, and thus, subject to taxation in Mexico.156 The latter type of 
commission agreement is analogous to a U.S. American contract for 
payment of commission. 
On the other hand, there is no literal translation of contrato de 
mediacion (intermediary's contract). The contrato de mediacion does 
not refer to mediation or arbitration as used in the U.S. American legal 
context. 157 The contract generally refers to providing an intermediary 
service for a fee (not a commission). Through this intermediary service 
an entity or a person introduces the product to potential buyers (i.e., 
through catalogues) with the understanding that potentially interested 
buyers will contact · the seller directly without any further services 
required of the "intermediary."158 Because this contract does not 
create an agency relationship, there are no tax consequences. 159 
Although it is vaguely similar to a consultant's relationship, the contrato 
de mediacion has no counterpart in the United States. The foregoing 
contracts would establish very distinct rights and obligations of the 
parties,160 some with analogues in the United States (such as the 
contrato de comision), and some which vaguely resemble types of 
155. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 72-73, and Jose Maria Abascal Zamora, 
Contrato de Comisi6n, in A-CH DICCIONARIO JURIDICO MEXICANO, 526-529 (Editorial 
Porrua, S.A., 7th ed. 1994), discussing "comisi6n mercantil." 
156. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 73. 
157. See Fernando Alejandro Vasquez Pando, Contrato de Mediaci6n in A-CH 
DICCIONARIO JURIDICO MEXICANO, supra note 155, at 704-706 (for a legal definition of 
"contrato de mediaci6n"). 
158. Id. 
159. See Gordon supra note 24, at 73. 
160. Id. at 73-75. 
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contracts in the United States but are without legal equivalents (such as 
the contrato de mediacion). 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that objective and subjective 
linguistic thought will not correspond in the minds of individuals of 
different cultural and linguistic backgrounds because different methods 
of legal reasoning and different values underlie the different legal 
systems in which they operate. Unless the parties become aware of the 
differences in their linguistic and cultural assumptions, the likelihood of 
misunderstandings and miscommunications in legal discourse between 
parties of different legal systems, languages, and cultures is great. 161 
1. Professional Competency: Where Language, Culture and Law 
Meet on a Daily Bp.sis 
The legal profession and tradition is particularly language sensi-
tive.162 Without language there would not be laws or la~ers. The 
business of lawyers is to transact or litigate through words.1 3 Compe-
tency in the profession, therefore, requires expertise in legal discourse. 
Legal discourse consists of knowledge of legal terms, semantics, 
grammar, and legal language's "performative function," all of which are 
culturally defined. 
Like all other languages, legal language is culturally bound. Yet, 
unlike other languages, legal language is "performative."164 Legal 
language has an inherent and special formative attribute in that it "makes 
things true simply by saying them."165 For example, legislative 
enactments create norms of individual behavior; judicial orders dictate 
behavior of parties; juries determine fact from non-fact and relate facts 
to law; and parties to a contract ordain rights and obligations pursuant 
to written or oral agreement. Societal values and norms are expressed 
through the performative function of legal language, and the meaning of 
a legal statement is related to the social and cultural context in which it 
is formulated. 166 Proper choice of a legal term and its appropriate use 
in discourse is culturally structured. "The immediate social situation 
and the broader social milieu wholly determine-and determine from 
within, so to speak--the structure of an utterance. "167 Furthermore, 
161. See the Frigaliment discussion supra. 
162. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW at vii (1963). 
163. See Bourdieu;supra note 67, at 809; see also Geller, supra note 66, at 210-11. 
164. See Bourdieu, supra note 67; Geller, supra note 66. 
165. See Bourdieu, supra note 67; Geller, supra note 66. 
166. See Quinn & Holland, supra note 60; see also GEERTZ, supra note 50. 
167. V. N. VOLOSINOV, Verbal Interaction, SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY 
ANTHOLOGY, 53 (R. E. Innis, ed., 1985). 
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whether or not and to what extent particular aspects of legal discourse 
have performative functions will vary cross-culturally.168 Professional 
competency, then, is dependent on how knowledgeable the practitioner 
is of the legal discourse of the particular culture or cultures involved. 
Lack of competency in legal discourse is directly related to lack of 
knowledge of legal language within its cultural context, which in turn 
lead to misunderstanding and miscommunication. Misunderstanding and 
miscommunication involving legal discourse take place when speakers 
of the same language and culture interact; 169 when speakers of the 
same language and different cultures interact;170 and, most importantly, 
when speakers of different languages and different cultures interact.171 
The increased likelihood of misunderstanding and miscommunicating is 
found in the latter type of legal discourse because "the structure [ and 
meaning] of legal discourse in different legal cultures will be, by 
definition, diverse."172 Problems regarding professional competency, 
professional responsibility, and malpractice are also likely to increase in 
the latter instance.173 
168. See discussion supra regarding the function of classification in civil as opposed 
to common law systems. 
169. See Hill, supra note 113, at 581-91. 
170. See, e.g., Frigaliment discussion supra. 
171. In the business world, examples abound of cultural and linguistic errors by 
American firms in marketing products in other cultures and in other languages. For 
example, General Motors' "Body by Fisher" appeared in Flemish as "Corpse by Fisher;"' 
Pepsi-Cola's "Come Alive with Pepsi" appeared as "Pepsi brings your ancestors back 
from the grave" in Chinese; and, "rendezvous lounges" in passenger aircrafts in Brazil 
translated as "room[s] for making love" in Portuguese. Ferraro, supra note 122, at 39 
( citing PAUL SIMON, THE TONGUE-TIED AMERICAN (New York: Continuum Press, 1980). 
The slogan "it takes a tough man to make a tender chicken," appeared in Spanish as, "it 
takes a virile man to make a chicken affectionate." Id. (citing Susan R. Parr, 
International Education: Do not Leave Home Without It, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Nov. 17, 1992, at 19). 
Such errors have resulted in millions of dollars of losses and damage to U.S. American 
firms' reputations and credibility. Aware of the high cost of inter-linguistic and inter-
cultural problems, graduate schools of business have recognized the need to educate their 
students to participate in the globalization era by offering specialized courses in the 
culture of other nations in their domestic language. For example, Columbia Graduate 
School of Management is currently offering such courses. The potential for misunder-
standing and miscommunication in the legal setting is great with the result being just as 
damaging, in addition to the increased potential for malpractice liability and ethics viola-
tions. Law schools should emulate the business school model in training future 
practitioners of transnational law. 
172. See Saltman, supra note 54, at 117. 
173. See Waxman, supra note 4. 
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G. Professional Competency and Professional Responsibility: A 
Case of "Broken Spanish" and "Broken English" 
A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, In re Disciplinary Action 
David L. Curl, 174 illustrates the intersection between professional 
competency and professional responsibility in an inter-linguistic and 
inter-cultural setting. In re Curl concerned the disciplinary hearing of 
an Arizona attorney for the unintentional misrepresentation of a 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Sonora, Mexico (Sonoran court). 
Curl relied on his client's representation as to the legal interpretation and 
effect of the Mexican judgment of the Sonoran court.175 His client, 
who had been the defendant in the underlying matter, had represented to 
him that the Sonoran court had entered a judgment on the merits in his 
favor and that he had obtained a Mexican attorney's opinion on the 
issue. Curl subsequently confirmed the interpretation and legal effect of 
the judgment with another Mexican attorney.176 However, Curl did not 
speak fluent Spanish and the Mexican attorney with whom he consulted 
did not speak fluent English. Curl and the Mexican attorney discussed 
the legal meaning and effect of the Sonoran court's holding in "broken 
Spanish" and "broken English."177 The Sonoran court ruled for Curl's 
client and awarded him costs of the trial. However, the judgment was 
not a judgment on the merits; the Sonoran court also held that plaintiff's 
appeal was dismissed without prejudice and plaintiff could proceed to 
vindicate its rights in the appropriate manner (in Spanish, "por lo que se 
dejan a salvo sus derechos para que los haga valer en la via y forma 
correspondiente").178 Plaintiff had already brought suit successfully in 
an United States district court against Curl's client.179 
On appeal, Curl represented to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that 
the Sonoran court's judgment was a decision on the merits. In both 
Curl's appellate brief and in his oral argument, he reiterated his 
representation of the Sonoran court's judgment. Curl argued that the 
judgment was subject to comity and plaintiff's suit was barred by the 
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. 180 The Ninth Circuit 
174. 803 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1986). 
175. Id. 




180. 803 F.2d at 1006. 
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Court of Appeals upheld the United States district court's judgment in 
favor of plaintiff. 181 
The Ninth Circuit sanctioned Curl by public admonition.182 The 
court reasoned no prudent U.S. American attorney would rely on his 
client's interpretation of foreign law or rely on the interpretation or legal 
effect of a foreign judgment based on the opinion of an attorney of the 
foreign jurisdiction when neither attorney spoke the other's language 
fluently. 183 The court held that this behavior was "reckless" and Curl 
had violated the standards of professional responsibility and his duty to 
the court.184 
In this case, the U.S. American attorney brought the appeal because 
he believed there was a final judgment in his client's favor. He did not 
understand the legal meaning and effect of the Mexican judgment. He 
was unfamiliar with Mexican civil law; he did not know the Spanish 
legal language and he lacked linguistic and cultural competence. Had 
he known Mexican legal discourse, he would not have had to rely on a 
Mexican attorney's opinion as to the legal effect of the Sonoran court's 
judgment. If he had knowledge of Mexican legal discourse, at a 
minimum, he would have been alerted to the probable misunderstanding 
and lniscommunication with Mexican counsel and would have sought 
another opinion. In either case, he would have known that an appeal 
would not lie on the grounds of comity, collateral estoppel, and res 
judicata and would have thought twice about bringing a "baseless" 
appeal.18s 
Problems such as Curl's are likely to increase in inter-cultural and 
inter-linguistic situations due to a lack of linguistic and cultural 
knowledge. However, legal discourse issues of this type are not 
insurmountable. Legal discourse can be learned. Culture is comprised 
of both implicit and explicit characteristics and values.186 The organi-
zation of such knowledge is ascertainable to a functional degree and may 
181. Id. at 1005. 




186. See Bourdieu, supra note 67, at 806. 
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be learned187 together with legal language. 188 The purpose is to learn 
to understand from the speaker's viewpoint. 189 
Proficiency in a language and culture requires awareness and training. 
Law schools, therefore, should be preparing law students for a globalized 
legal market by training them in the foreign law, culture, and legal 
language of the country or countries in which their legal services are 
most likely to be in demand. Countries in which the interests of U.S. 
American clients are likely to arise and legal services are likely to be 
needed, such as the United States' major trading partners, Canada, 
Mexico, and Japan. 
1. NAFTA: Competency and Professional Responsibility 
In order to be competitive in the NAFTA marketplace, future 
practitioners must be competent and meet the standards of professional 
responsibility. For situations in which Mexican law is at issue, the 
attorney in the case must either become competent to deal with the 
matter 190 or seek competent counsel on behalf of the client. 191 The 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Profession-
al Responsibility require that a lawyer handle competently the client's 
matter by being prepared to address every pertinent legal issue in the 
case. Failure to do so is an ethical violation and a basis for malpractice 
liability. Since U.S. American lawyers, with few exceptions, are not 
sufficiently versed in Mexican law, at a minimum they must seek 
187. But see von Mehren, supra note 37, at 255 (stating that the need to "operate 
effectively in transactions involving more than one legal system requires a kind of 
insight and feel that perhaps relatively few lawyers have and that probably cannot be 
explicitly taught except in the sense of developing an awareness of potential difficul-
ties"). This author is of the opinion that teaching in the domestic language of the 
foreign legal system will increase awareness and proficiency of the foreign law under 
study. The assumption is not being made that one will entirely understand and operate 
in the foreign legal system as if one had been born, raised and educated as a local 
practitioner. Instead, the goal should be to train future practitioners to achieve 
proficiency to the level of competency. 
188. See Geller, supra note 66, at 208, 209 (noting that since languages are 
translatable, cultural obstacles are not impenetrable, even though certain variables, i.e., 
time, distance, disparities of outlook or assumptions, make the act of translation difficult) 
(citing GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 48 
(2d ed. 1992)). 
189. See Hill, supra note 113, at 576. 
190. See supra note 29. See also In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 144 N.E.2d 24, 165 
N.Y.S.2d 31 (1957) (holding that attorneys admitted to the New York State Bar who are 
retained to handle a case dealing with foreign law have a duty to the client to know the 
foreign law at issue and may not claim otherwise). 
191. See Goebel, supra note 3; see also Waxman, supra note 4. 
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counsel who has adequate knowledge and preparation.192 However, 
transferring cases to other attorneys due to lack of competence in the 
legal area is less than optimal. The better solution is to educate U.S. 
American law students to be competent attorneys in the area, thus 
making them competitive.193 
Lack of cultural knowledge will also limit entry into the NAFTA 
market.194 For example, cultural variances in negotiation styles can 
impede expansion due to miscommunication and different cultural 
expectations of appropriate behavior. In Mexico, for instance, negotia-
tion discourse, behavior, and goals differ from U.S. American negotia-
tion discourse, behavior, and goals. 195 Relationship and time are 
treated differently in this context.196 On a general level, Mexican 
cultural discourse includes personal introduction of the parties and 
personal knowledge about the parties before negotiating. Because the 
individual is "perceived as the essence of his or her business,"197 
inquiries into areas, such as family and personal interests, are made over 
meals and other social events, with the goal of building both trust and 
an ongoing relationship.198 U.S. Americans, on the other hand, 
perceive contracting as a business-to-business relationship.199 Conse-
quently, an U.S. American might "cold call" somebody to propose a 
meeting to discuss an idea for a business venture; when the parties meet, 
after a few pleasantries, they "get down to business" and follow a 
192. This, however, is problematic if the U.S. American lawyer is selecting Mexican 
counsel with whom she is unfamiliar and she desires to continue to act in the matter as 
co-counsel. Communicating with Mexican counsel may prove troublesome if the North 
American attorney does not speak Spanish and understand sufficient legal Spanish 
terminology to discuss strategy and make decisions. Moreover, such circumstances 
would require a contractual relationship with co-counsel from Mexico requiring 
knowledge of Mexican law, legal, social and political culture and Spanish legal 
terminology. 
193. Currently, representatives of the NAFTA countries are discussing requirements 
for Foreign Legal Consultants, as permitted by NAFT A provision. 
194. See, e.g., Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75. 
195. See generally Rona R. Mears, Contracting in Mexico: A Legal and Practical 
Guide to Negotiating and Drafting, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737 (1993). See also Arvind 
V. Phatak and Mohammed M. Habib, The Dynamics of International Business 
Negotiations, BUSINESS HORIZONS, May-June 1996, at 30, 34. 
196. See Mears, supra note 196, at 757, 758; Phatak and Habib, supra note 196, at 
34. 
197. Mears, supra note 196, at 755. 
198. Id. at 757-58. 
199. Id. at 756, 757. 
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specific set of points on an agenda.200 For U.S. Americans, "time is 
money," set procedures, and punctuality (as defined by U.S. American 
norms) are important values and functions in the business context.201 
By contrast, Mexicans perceive time based on valued social norms 
conducive to strong family and friendship ties. Time is an "endless 
continuum-context[,] rather than constraint--in which we live" and in 
which personal relationships develop.202 Thus, the style of negotia-
tions and the determination as to whether or not the negotiations were 
successful is dictated by cultural expectations and interpretations 
concerning the appropriate manner of conducting business. 203 
G. Comparative Law and International Law: Where Law, Culture, 
and Language Meet in the Law School Curriculum 
Historically, U.S. American law school curricula have virtually ignored 
substantive courses on the culture and legal terminology of other 
nations.204 Generally, there has been no recognition of the need to 
train students in areas dealing either with laws of foreign nations or with 
legal cultures and legal language of other sovereign states. Only two 
substantive law areas in the U.S. law school curriculum have dealt 
consistently with legal culture and legal terminology of other sovereign 
nations: comparative law and international law. This section reviews the 
role of these two disciplines in legal education and explores their 
relationship to courses teaching foreign law, culture, and legal language. 
1. Comparative Law 
Comparative law has not been considered a significant part of law 
school education.205 This perception arises from the assumption that 
it is unnecessary to train students in "esoteric" areas.206 The compara-
tive law approach consists of comparing and contrasting the domestic 
200. Id.; see also Phatak and Habib, supra note 196, at 34. 
201. See Mears, supra note 196, at 756, 757; see also Phatak and Habib, supra note 
196, at 34. 
202. See Phatak and Habib, supra note 196, at 34. 
203. See Mears, supra note 196, at 758. Mears provides solutions to these 
problems. Id. at 759. 
204. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 391; see also Garro, supra note 10, at 271. 
205. Professor Waxman indicates that a survey oflaw school curricula demonstrates 
that comparative law is not a graduation requirement at most law schools; it is an 
elective and is within a "required course grouping" only at six law schools throughout 
the U.S. In a few instances, it is altogether omitted from the curriculum. Waxman, 
supra note 4, at 391. 
206. Id. (emphasizing that these subjects, like jurisprudence, are perceived to be 
esoteric in nature and "shunted off to the academic sidelines"). 
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substantive and procedural laws of differing legal systems.207 Its 
primary goal, "as a science, [is to obtain] better knowledge oflegal rules 
and institutions."208 Comparative law, therefore, generally is consid-
ered to have theoretical not "practical value."209 
Due to the impetus of globalization, law schools, law students, and the 
practicing bar should re-examine the role of comparative law "in legal 
education [as] essential to meet the needs of America and its legal 
advisors in the 1990s and beyond . . . . In the twenty-first century, 
attorneys will regularly address domestic and foreign legal issues, 
involving diverse cultures, in differing legal contexts."210 Consequent-
ly, at least one comparativist has proposed that comparative law be 
integrated into the first-year curriculum.211 
The inclusion of the comparative law approach in first-year courses 
would be an introduction to other legal systems.212 Students would 
benefit by exposure to different legal systems; fostering an awareness of 
the variety in legal systems, legal culture, and legal terminology, and 
highlighting areas where some problems are likely to develop. However, 
to provide more than only a cursory overview of foreign legal systems, 
there would still be a need for additional specialized study in the foreign 
law, culture, and legal language of a particular nation, specifically, of the 
major U.S. American trading partners. A year-long foreign law course 
would not purport to train students to become fully competent213 
practitioners in transnational law. However, such a foreign law course 
207. Id. at 397. But see Frankenberg, supra note 11 passim (criticizing the lack of 
a common purpose and approach among comparativists as an additional reason for 
marginalization of the discipline). 
208. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law 
(Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. l, 5 (1991). 
209. Id. at 1. But see Port, supra note 33, at 643 (proposing that U.S. American 
law schools teach Japanese law from a comparative law perspective, in light of U.S. 
American economic interests in Japan). 
210. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 391. 
211. Id. (citing Robert A. Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 
945, 958, 959 (1991), and Goebel, supra note 3, at 458-60). 
212. Id. at 397 (opining that comparative law would "invariably provide a practical 
introduction into the legitimacy of distinct legal and cultural backgrounds"). 
213. Few law students graduate with sufficient knowledge and skills training to be 
competent attorneys from the outset. However, the role of law schools is to provide, at 
a minimum, an adequate introduction to substantive law areas and to teach a method of 
analysis which the lawyer in practice may apply to any area of law. Excluding an entire 
area of substantive law, such as foreign law, in which a clients' needs are likely to be 
greater, potentially contributes to a practitioners' incompetence. 
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would serve as a significant introduction to the spe'ci:fic areas of a 
particular country's legal system creating a substantive base upon which 
additional professional training could be obtained. Incorporating a 
comparative law approach would be a significant first, but limited, step 
toward adequately training transnational lawyers. A comparative law 
course could be a prerequisite to taking a foreign law course (because it 
would provide a good overview upon which a foreign law course could 
build). However, a comparative law course alone would not serve the 
purpose of training students to be practitioners as effectively as training 
them in the law, culture, and legal language of the particular foreign 
jurisdiction which is likely to form part of their students' practice. 
2. International Law 
Both academics and practitioners regard international law, like 
com~arative law, as an esoteric discipline, peripheral to legal educa-
tion. 14 Academics have considered international law a '"fringe' 
specialty, well meaning, even noble, but naive and largely irrelevant to 
the real world. ,,,21s International law rarely is a law school curriculum 
requirement and "mainstream" law journals rarely publish international 
law materials.216 Additionally, despite the increase in international 
treaties in the 1980s which have extended the domain of international 
law to include private acts and transactions (such as wills, trusts, 
decedents' estates, adoption of children, abduction of children, commer-
cial sale of goods, electronic fund transfers, bills of exchange, and 
promissory notes),217 practitioners, like academics, have been reluctant 
to recognize the need for training future attorneys in international law. 
Problems of interpretation and application of treaty provisions, 
conflicts of law, and enforceability of judgments, historically, have 
occurred in intemational law.218 These problems have been based on 
214. See Trimble, supra note 11, at 811. 
215. Id. at 811 (quoting John K. Gamble, Jr. & Natalie S. Shields, International 
Legal Scholarship: A Perspective on Teaching and Publishing, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 39, 
39 (1989)) (indicating that the lack ofrelationship between law and politics espoused by 
international law scholars forms the basis for the perception that international law "is 
irrelevant to the real world"). Professor Trimble argues that it is essential to connect 
international law with "its political base" to re-establish its credibility in academia and 
the profession. Id. at 823. 
216. "[A] survey showed that less than 1 percent of the articles published between 
1983 and 1985 in thirty major law reviews dealt with public international law. Even in 
the specialized international law journals, law faculty accounted for less than 40 percent 
of the total articles published." Id. at 811. 
217. Id. at 811, 812. 
218. Id. at 837. 
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cultural and linguistic differences.219 For example, "German courts 
[have tended] to interpret the Geneva Conventions on bills of exchange 
and checks as if only domestic law were involved, without reference to 
other countries' interpretation."220 Additionally, uniform laws (which 
have been carefully constructed to avoid ambiguities and misunderstand-
ings) have been differentially applied because actors from different 
nations are charged with their interpretation and implementation. 
Problems of interpretation and application will increase because the 
nature of international law has changed substantially over the last two 
decades.221 International law no longer is concerned solely with the 
regulation of public relations of sovereign nations.222 The field of· 
international law has expanded to include regulation of: ( 1) private 
parties' relations and transactions with private parties from other nations; 
and (2) governmental actors transacting in the private domain of 
international commerce.223 Varying national traditions, cultures, 
languages, values, and interests will form· the bases for interpretation and 
application of law in the new treaty areas and will create pitfalls which 
can be avoided224 by training students in specific foreign countries' 
legal systems, cultures, and languages. Another reason to consider 
offering foreign law, culture, and language courses in the curriculum is 
that international law practitioners tend to limit the scope of their 
219. See Trimble, supra note 11, at 836, 837. 
220. Id. at 837, n.99 (citing Oral statement of Ulrich Drobnig, in INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT}, INTERNATIONAL 
UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE 305, 306 (1988)). Trimble notes that this phenomenon of 
differential interpretation and implementation has applied in a variety of uniform law 
settings, e.g., the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading, and the 
United Nations Convention on the Sale of Goods. This is likely to happen in the 
interpretation of NAFT A provisions, since three countries' legal cultures, languages, and 
political systems are involved. Id. at 837, 838. 
221. Id. at 812. 
222. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 100 (discussing the need to understand the role of 
soft law in international law due to the paradigmatic shift occurring in the last two 
decades). The shift that has taken place has resulted in moving away from the "classic" 
international law which dealt with the "state-to-state relations [of a] limited number of 
fairly homogenous states" toward complex "deepening global interdependencies in 
international security, environmental and economic matters[,]" evidencing (l) communal 
purposes among states; and (2) the increasing role of nonstate actors. Id. at 372. 
223. Id. 
224. Trimble, supra note 11, at 837 (citing Zhivko Stalev, The Uniform CMEA Law 
and Its Uniform Application, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF 
PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT), INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE 231, 235-36 
(1988)). 
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practice to specific nations. Transnational lawyers, therefore, need in 
depth knowledge in foreign law, culture, and domestic legal languages 
of the particular nations that are the focus of their practice. For 
example, practice in the area of NAFTA will require knowledge of the 
Mexican and Canadian (inc;luding the Quebe9ois) legal systems, culture, 
and language (in the case of Mexico and Quebec, Spanish and 
Quebe9ois, respectively). Additionally, some areas of substantive law, 
such as foreign investment, are subject directly to regulation by the 
foreign nation's laws. Thus, transactional lawyers will require knowl-
edge of the specific foreign legal system, including "soft law."225 The 
law school curriculum should reflect these needs. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
The legal culture and terminology of the common law system has been 
assumed to be the only legal culture and terminology appropriate for 
training law students. In light of globalization, failure to train students 
in laws, culture, and legal language of other nations will lead to 
inadequately prepared lawyers in the expanding legal market place. The 
conscious knowledge of legal culture and legal language in the operation 
of a legal system is paramount in understanding and applying laws 
within any society. Misunderstanding and lack of awareness occur 
intraculturally, when it is assumed that the same or similar assumptions 
are operating in order to interpret, among other things, law, legal 
strategy, policy, and negotiations. The likelihood of misunderstanding 
and lack of cultural awareness will be exacerbated and will impede 
lawyering when law school graduates begin practicing in greater 
numbers in inter-cultural and inter-linguistic arenas. Knowledge of 
foreign laws, legal cultures, and legal languages leads to an understand-
ing and awareness which will make them more effective lawyers, 
domestically and intemationally.226 
U.S. American law students are more likely to practice transnational 
law, requiring knowledge of the Canadian, Mexican, and Japanese legal 
systems, cultures, and legal languages, during this era of increased 
globalization. Canada, Mexico, and Japan are currently the United 
225. See Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 313 (noting 
specifically that practitioners should not rely unduly on international law norms because 
often developing nations reject these laws since they are perceived by the developing 
nations as having been imposed upon them, historically, by developed nations. 
Consequently, Gordon assumes that developing nations will control foreign investment 
through their respective regulatory frameworks.). 
226. See Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview, What We Talk 
About When We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 40, 41 (1992). 
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States's major trade partners, and are likely to remain so into the twenty-
first century. Furthermore, because of NAFTA's impact, as well as 
Mexico's prominent role in Latin America's markets and its influential 
role in Latin America's legal systems, knowledge of Mexican law, 
culture, and the Spanish legal language, in particular, will provide the 
greatest access to transnational markets in the Northern and Southern 
American hemispheres. 
Law schools have a duty to prepare students to be effective, competi-
tive, and ethical practitioners. By not preparing students to specialize in 
foreign law areas during this era of globalization, law schools will be 
failing in the performance of this duty. Legal education, therefore, 
should include, at a minimum, courses on the law, culture, and language 
of Canada, Mexico, and Japan. Furthermore, if only one area of foreign 
law is to be selected, then legal educators should choose to incorporate 
courses in Mexican law, culture, and the Spanish legal language for the 
reasons discussed above. 
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